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CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AGAINST FILESHARING
SERVICES
Benton Martin and Jeremiah Newhalr
The high-profile prosecution of the popular online storage website
Megaupload for criminal copyright infringement is the latest in a
series of recent criminal prosecutions of online filesharing
services. This Article addresses what pushes a legitimate online
file-storing business over the edge to criminal enterprise, and how
criminal copyright enforcement differs from civil enforcement.
The Article first explains the history of criminal copyright
enforcement in the United States. It then addresses why
"secondary" theories of infringement apply in the criminal, as well
as civil, context and why the DMCA "safe harbor" defense is a red
herring in criminal copyright actions. It concludes by suggesting
guidelines for prosecutorial discretion in enforcing criminal
copyright law against filesharing services, proposing that
prosecutions be limited to theories of liability already established
in civil case law, and that prosecutors target only prominent
filesharing-service operators that openly defy civil enforcement
actions.
Benton Martin is a law clerk to the Honorable Geraldine Soat Brown,
Presiding Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Illinois. Jeremiah
Newhall is a litigator at the Vermont law firm of Ellis, Boxer & Blake PLLC,
where his practice includes federal criminal defense. Previously, the authors
clerked together in the staff attorney's office of the Seventh Circuit. The views
in this Article are those of the authors and in no way reflect the views of the
judiciary. The authors wish to thank Julia Rickert, Andrew Moshirnia, Andrew
Sellars, and most especially Meghan Martin and Karina Newhall.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2012, an elite squad of New Zealand anti-terrorism
officers, under the direction of the United States Department of
Justice, stormed Kim Dotcom's lavish $24-million mansion.
Equipped with body armor, tactical firearms, dog units, and a
helicopter, the squad uncovered Dotcom hiding in a specially
designed saferoom.2 As he was whisked to a police van, Dotcom
asked the charges against him. The answer was two words:
"Copyright infringement."'
The indictment of Dotcom and his infamous filesharing
service, Megaupload, marked the start of a new battle in what
reporters have christened the "copyright wars."4 Yet it is not the
federal government's only recent foray into the fight against online
filesharing services, which have been under a decade-long siege of
civil litigation by media companies and the government because of
these services' reputations as hotbeds for copyright infringement.'
In 2010, for example, the Department of Homeland Security
mounted "Operation in Our Sites" to seize the domain names of
websites providing access to infringing content,6 and the operation
' Charles Graeber, 10 Days Inside the Mansion-and Mind-of Kim Dotcom,
the Most Wanted Man on the Internet, WIRED (Oct. 18, 2012, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/ff-kim-dotcom/.
2 Id.
3 id.
4 Dan Mitchell, Pirates Take Sweden, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/08/19/business/19online.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
& r-0. Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of America,
has gone one step further, comparing efforts to force Internet service providers
to remove infringing material to fighting a "terrorist war." Amy Harmon, Black
Hawk Download; Moving Beyond Music, Pirates Use New Tools to Turn the Net
Into an Illicit Video Club, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/01/17/technology/black-hawk-download-moving-beyond-music-pirates-
use-new-tools-turn-net-into.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
5 NATE ANDERSON, THE INTERNET POLICE: How CRIME WENT ONLINE, AND
THE CoPs FOLLOWED 199-202 (Nate Anderson ed., 2013) (documenting the
history of this litigation).
6 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2010 U.S.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 4 (Feb. 2011), available at
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has since resulted in the seizure of more than 400 domain names.'
The issue more recently caught the attention of Congress, where
bills were introduced in both the House and Senate to target
foreign websites that link to or host infringing content.'
But these efforts have not always been effective. For many of
the domain names seized by the Department of Homeland
Security, the same infringing content quickly reappeared on sites
with only slightly modified web addresses, and a few sites even
grew in popularity.' And the backlash against the two new bills
was fierce: a swarm of popular websites, including the online
encyclopedia Wikipedia, staged a "blackout" in protest, citing fears
that they would face sanctions merely for linking to controversial
sites, even in informational articles."o Because of this opposition,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec annual-report
feb201 1.pdf.
7 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2012 U.S.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR JOINT STRATEGIC
PLAN 1 (June 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec two-year anniversaryreport.pdf.
See Mike Belleville, IP Wars: SOPA, PIPA, and the Fight Over Online
Piracy, 26 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 303, 303-04 (2012).
9 Andy Sellars, The In Rem Forfeiture of Copyright-Infringing Domain Names
32 (Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP., Working Paper),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftm?abstract id= 1835604.
Onsmash.com moved to freeonsmash.com, for example, and increased from the
9520th most popular website in this country to the 7194th. Id.; see also Rob
Fischer, A Ninja in Our Sites, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://prospect.org/article/ninja-our-sites ("Not surprisingly, the Spanish-based
Rojadirecta enjoyed a sizable bump in traffic immediately following the seizure
of its U.S.-based site."); ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 217 ("Numerous site
operators simply purchased new names not registered in the United States
(www.ihatecopyright.eu, for instance) and continued with business as usual.").
'0 Ned Potter, Wikipedia Blackout: Websites Wikipedia, Reddit, Others Go
Dark Wednesday to Protest SOPA, PIPA, ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wikipedia-blackout-websites-wikipedia-
reddit-dark-wednesday-protest/story?id=15373251#.UNSZKax5Gq8; Jenna
Wortham, With Twitter, Blackouts and Demonstrations, Web Flexes Its Muscle,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/
protests-of-antipiracy-bills-unite-web.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
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the bills were quickly shelved."
Meanwhile, other countries like Japan and Sweden have seen
some success in directly prosecuting the operators of filesharing
services. First, Japan convicted Isamu Kaneko, a computer-science
researcher who developed Winny, an early peer-to-peer filesharing
system. 2 Kaneko arguably fostered dubious uses of his service by
collecting feedback and announcing updates through an
anonymous Internet forum dedicated to filesharing. " Although
Kaneko was convicted by a Japanese district court, the Osaka High
Court reversed the conviction after concluding that Winny was
"value neutral"-essentially, capable of non-infringing uses-and
that Kaneko did not offer Winny primarily to promote
infringement, even if he knew that it was probably being used for
that purpose.1" This decision touches on a key question in this
Article: If a filesharing service is known to have rampant
infringing uses, at what point do the service's operators open
themselves to criminal sanctions?
More successful was Sweden's prosecution of the operators of
The Pirate Bay, then one of the Internet's largest peer-to-peer
filesharing services." The operators of The Pirate Bay mocked
their contribution to infringing activity, often publishing and
" ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 221 (predicting that SOPA "will no doubt
return" as the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, a major
international lobbying force for the recording industry, "still lists all of SOPA's
core provisions as key legislative priorities").
12 Salil K. Mehra, Keep America Exceptional! Against Adopting Japanese and
European-Style Criminalization of Contributory Copyright Infringement, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 811, 817 (2011).
" Id at 816-17.
14 Id. at 818-19 (citing Kyoto Chiho Saibansho [Kyoto Dist. Ct.] Dec. 13,
2006, Hei 16 (wa) no. 726, 1229 HANREi TIMES 105 (Japan), rev'd, Osaka Koto
Saibansho [Osaka High Ct.] Oct. 8, 2009, Hei 19 (wa) no. 461 (Japan)).
15 See Stephen Bright, Current Development, The Current State of BitTorrent
in International Law: Why Copyright Law is Ineffective and What Needs to
Change, 17 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 265, 266 (2011); Jerker Edstrom &
Henrik Nillson, The Pirate Bay Verdict--Predictable, and Yet . 31 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REv., no. 9, at 483 (2009).
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ridiculing complaints from copyright organizations. 16 Although
Sweden once had a reputation for relaxed copyright laws, the
country amended its Copyright Act in 2005 to make it a crime to
transfer copyrighted content without permission. "When prosecutors
then indicted four operators of The Pirate Bay in 2008 for
"complicity" in violating the Act, the operators raised the same
arguments as Kaneko-that their services had non-infringing uses,
and that they were ignorant of any specific infringing activity."
The court nonetheless found the operators guilty, emphasizing that
they had profited from infringing content by collecting advertising
revenue and that knowledge of specific infringing content was
unnecessary given that they had created conditions that fostered
infringement and ignored notices of infringing content. 19 The
defendants were each sentenced to one year in prison and ordered
to pay restitution of $4.3 million.20
The success of The Pirate Bay prosecution has been called a
harbinger of actions like the one against Megaupload. 21 Yet
criminal prosecution of filesharing services is a new development
in the United States, and only time will tell whether this new
approach proves effective, or under what circumstances it should
be used. The future holds many questions. What pushes a
legitimate online file-storing business into the territory of criminal
enterprise? How might criminal copyright enforcement differ
materially from civil enforcement? This Article seeks to answer
16 Bright, supra note 15, at 277; Tara Touloumis, Buccaneers and Bucks from
the Internet: Pirate Bay and the Entertainment Industry, 19 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS & ENT. L. 253, 265 (2009).
17 Bright, supra note 15, at 277; see also Bernard A. Mantel, The Google
Police: How the Indictment of The Pirate Bay Presents a New Solution to
Internet Piracy, 20 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 77, 84 (2011).
'8 Mantel, supra note 17, at 85-87.
9 Id. at 89 (citing Tingsrtitt [TR] [Stockholm District Court] 2009-04-17 p. 1
B 13301-06 at 24 (Swed.), as translated by The International Federation of the
Phonographic Industry, IFPI, http://www.ifpi.org/content/section-about/index.
html).
20 Id. at 90-91.
21 Bright, supra note 15, at 276-78; see also Mehra, supra note 12, at 822
("The pressure to internationalize and harmonize the response to P2P also
increases the possibility of American criminalization of contributory
infringement.").
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these questions. It focuses on those online businesses enabling
users to share infringing content with others online. These
businesses will be referred to simply as "filesharing services," with
the intent that this definition covers diverse types of technology-
including "cyberlockers" like Megaupload, which host files on
servers controlled by the service, and "torrent" sites like The Pirate
Bay, which provide links to connect users to infringing files stored
by their peers.22
In the end, this Article concludes that criminal enforcement
actions should be limited to the most notorious filesharing service
operators that, in order to profiteer" from infringing content, foster
infringement by egregiously defying the established boundaries of
copyright law and civil means of copyright enforcement. Parts II
and III of this Article describe the history of criminal copyright
enforcement as well as significant developments in civil copyright
law, clarifying the liability of filesharing services as secondary
infringers. Part IV digs into the differences between the civil and
criminal copyright landscape for filesharing services and the
potential for "safe harbors" from criminal culpability for Internet
service providers. Part V proposes guidelines for courts and
prosecutors to consider when evaluating the propriety of a criminal
enforcement action against filesharing services and discusses the
procedural benefits to the government in criminal proceedings.
Part VI concludes with a cautionary note about the powers
available to prosecutors in this context.
22 See generally Bill Wyman, So Long, and Thanks for All the Pirated Movies,
SLATE (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/technology/2012
/01/megaupload shutdown what the site s departure means for other traffic
hogging cyberlockers .html (discussing the function and business models of
various cyberlocker sites). Cyberlockers like Megaupload in fact developed in
part to give users more anonymity than torrent-type websites, which exposed
users' IP addresses to facilitate sharing. See ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 202-
03. Cyberlockers, in contrast, offered direct downloads from a centralized
server, guarding users' IP addresses but increasing the difficulty in finding
specific content. Id. at 203. In response, a number of "linking sites" developed
to collect links to infringing content. Id.
23 The profits at issue, however, must be in "real, non-Internet dollars."
Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2012).
For more discussion of "Internet money," see id. at 689.
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II. WAR BRIEFING: THE HISTORY OF CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT
ENFORCEMENT
Criminal copyright enforcement against parties other than
filesharing services is, of course, nothing new. The United States
first criminalized copyright infringement in 1897 by making it a
misdemeanor to conduct unauthorized performances of
copyrighted plays and music-as long as this infringement was
"willful and for profit."24 This law was intended to respond to
complaints from copyright holders about the difficulty of enforcing
their rights against troupes of traveling performers. 25 When
traveling performers remained a problem a decade later, Congress
expanded the law to punish all then-existing forms of copyright
infringement and the people-primarily theater owners and
agents-that aided or abetted infringers.26
Criminal copyright law remained unchanged until the 1970s,
when concerns about piracy of sound and video recordings led to
its rapid expansion.2 7 The Sound Recording Act of 197128 first
added protection for sound recordings.29 Five years later, the 1976
Copyright Act30 increased criminal fines for general infringement
(up to $10,000) and added even stiffer penalties for repeat
infringers or infringers of sound recordings and motion pictures.31
The 1976 Act also made repeat infringement a felony and changed
the "for profit" requirement 32 to its current form-infringement
24 Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
25 1. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 305, 315 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Michael Coblenz,
Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 235, 238-39 (1999).
26 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; see Miriam Bitton,
Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement's Criminal Copyright
Enforcement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67, 85 (2012); see also
Harv. L. Rev., Note, Criminalization of Copyright Infringement in the Digital
Era, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1705, 1707 (1999).
27 Bitton, supra note 26, at 85-86.
28 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
29 H.R. Rep. No. 93-1581, at 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6849,
6852; see Harv. L. Rev., supra note 26, at 1708.
30 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
31 See Harv. L. Rev., supra note 26, at 1709.
32 Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971).
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"for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain" 3 -to clarify that infringers need only intend financial gain to
be guilty.34 Although the 1976 Act dropped all mention of "aiding
and abetting" from the copyright statute, it appears that this change
was intended merely to remove surplusage because this conduct
remained a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 2.35 More to the point,
whether or not the intent was to remove surplusage, that was the
effect: Aiding and abetting criminal copyright remains a crime
under § 2(a).36 This pattern of increasing penalties continued into
the 1980s, as Congress responded to lobbying by the entertainment
industry for even harsher criminal sanctions, in part by making
first-time infringement, at least of significant quantities of
audiovisual works, a felony. 7
Unsurprisingly, popularization of personal computers and the
Internet in the 1990s further spurred concerns about piracy,
especially of software. 3 In response, Congress enacted the
Copyright Felony Act of 1992,39 expanding felony penalties to all
types of copyright infringers and increasing the general maximum
33 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) (2012).
34 Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property
Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 481 (2011); Harv. L. Rev., supra note
26, at 1708-09.
3 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 15.01[A][2] (2013); Harv. L. Rev., supra note 26, at 1709 n.39.
3 In fact, the statute covers not only aiding and abetting but willfully causing
a crime to be committed by another:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States,
is punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
3 Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The
Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the
Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 835, 842-43 (1999).
38 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 26, at 1711 ("Software manufacturers argued for
stricter penalties for software copyright infringement, claiming that the piracy
problems that had plagued the record and motion picture industry a decade ago
were now attacking the software industry.").
3 Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319
(2012).
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punishment for first-time offenders to five years' imprisonment, a
$250,000 fine, or both, as long as the infringer reproduced or
distributed at least ten copies, worth more than $2,500, within a
six-month timeframe.4 0 In 1996 Congress made counterfeiting
copyrighted works a racketeering offense under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.4' Then in 1997 came
the No Electronic Theft Act ("NET Act"),4 2 a law that would
foreshadow the Megaupload prosecution.
The impetus for the 1997 NET Act was a filesharing service
that allowed free downloads,43 conduct which is at the core of
Megaupload's alleged infringement. Before the Act's enactment,
the Department of Justice had attempted to convict student David
LaMacchia for maintaining an online bulletin board full of
infringing software files.44 Because LaMacchia shared these files
for free-and thus fell outside existing limits on criminal copyright
liability-the government indicted him for wire fraud rather than
copyright infringement. But a federal district court dismissed the
case, relying on Dowling v. United States,45 in which the Supreme
Court overturned the conviction of a bootleg-record transporter as
an impermissible subversion of carefully circumscribed copyright
law.4 6 Likewise, the LaMacchia court concluded, if not punishable
under copyright law, nonprofit infringers should not be punished
for wire fraud.4 7 This controversial decision is widely reported to
have motivated Congress's expansion of criminal copyright
liability in the NET.48 The Act sought to deter even not-for-profit
infringement by expanding the definition of "financial gain" to
cover "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value,
40 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 26, at 1711-12.
4 Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153,
110 Stat. 1386; see Manta, supra note 34, at 484.
42 Pub. L. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997).
43 See, e.g., Bitton, supra note 26, at 87; Manta, supra note 34, at 482.
" United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536-37 (D. Mass. 1994).
45 Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985).
4 6 LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp at 545.
47 Id. at 543-44.
48 See, e.g., Bitton, supra note 26, at 87 ("Congress was thus spurred by the
courts and the affected industries to broaden the scope of criminal liability to
deter copyright offenders who had no financial motivation.").
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including the receipt of other copyrighted works."49 The Act also
added penalties for any willful infringer who reproduced or
distributed $1,000 worth of infringing copies, regardless of
intended gain."o
Since that time, Congress has continued to ratchet up criminal
copyright penalties. Discontent with the NET Act's lack of
deterrent effect, Congress enacted the Digital Theft Deterrence and
Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999. " The Act's
approach was two-fold: It both increased the civil damages for
copyright infringement and clarified that the United States
Sentencing Commission would increase its recommended penalties
for intellectual property crimes involving high-value or high-
quantity infringement.5 2 Then, in 2004 and 2005, Congress created
the new copyright crimes of trafficking of counterfeit labels on
protected works53 and recording of motion pictures in theaters. 54
Finally, in 2008, Congress targeted counterfeiters again through
the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual
Property Act ("PRO-IP Act"), increasing criminal penalties for
counterfeiting that may cause bodily injury (as with knock-off
pharmaceuticals) and expanding the government's power to seize
counterfeit goods and the tools used to make them.56
49 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
5 0 Id. § 506 (2012); see also Harv. L. Rev., supra note 26, at 1715.
s Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999).
52 Manta, supra note 34, at 483-84 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 106-216, at 2
(1999)); see also Andrew W. Eichner, File Sharing: A Tool for Innovation, or a
Criminal Instrument, 2011 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. I n.98 (2011) (citing
H.R. 3456, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999)).
5 Anti-counterfeiting Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-482, tit. I,
118 Stat. 3912, 3912-16.
54 Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, tit. 1,
119 Stat. 218, 218-23. This Act was actually a sub-part of a larger piece of
legislation titled the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218-27.
s5 Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, § 1(a), 122 Stat. 4256.
56 Beverley Earle, Gerald A. Madek, & Christina Madek, Combating the New
Drug Trade of Counterfeit Goods: A Proposal for New Legal Remedies, 20
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 677, 697-98 (2012). The PRO-IP Act also
created a new executive position to coordinate federal copyright enforcement,
110 VOL. 15: 101
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III. RECENT COMBAT: ENFORCEMENT AGAINST FILESHARING
SERVICES
While this discussion has focused thus far on criminal
enforcement, much of the development of the application of
copyright law to filesharing services has arisen in civil, rather than
criminal, actions. Keystone developments include judicial
recognition, through federal common law, of secondary liability
for copyright infringement and relatively recent additions to digital
piracy laws creating "safe harbors" for Internet service providers.
Any discussion of criminal enforcement against filesharing
services must therefore address parallel developments in civil
litigation.
Perhaps the most significant statutory changes have been
generated by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"),"
enacted a year after the NET Act in an attempt to balance media
industry concerns over infringement with angst in the tech industry
about hindering digital innovation. 8 Although the DMCA
expanded the scope of criminal liability-making it a crime to
circumvent, or traffic devices designed to circumvent,
technological measures limiting access to copyrighted work59 -the
DMCA also created "safe harbors" for copyright infringement by
various Internet businesses, including Internet service providers
like Megaupload that host user-uploaded content.60 The popular
video-sharing site YouTube has used this relatively new doctrine
in ongoing litigation brought against it by entertainment
the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator, who is advised by
representatives from the Register of Copyrights and the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice, among others. 15 U.S.C. § 8111(b)(3) (2012). The
coordinator facilitates the creation and implementation of a Joint Strategic Plan.
Id. § 8111(b)(1)(B).
5 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
5 Harv. L. Rev., supra note 26, at 1717-18 (citing World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997)); World
Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec.
20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997); Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon
Signing H.R. 2281, in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 677, 677.
' 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012).
60 d. § 512(c); see Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 25 (2d
Cir. 2012) (interpreting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
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companies,6 successfully arguing that YouTube cannot be liable
for infringing videos unless it first receives proper "takedown
notices" about them.62 This decision has given rise to speculation
about the Megaupload defendants' ability to avail themselves of
this defense.63 Notably, however, as discussed later, even if they
otherwise met the provision's requirements, the defense appears to
be limited to civil actions alone.
YouTube is not the only company that has provoked litigation
over its filesharing services. This litigation has led courts to
address whether these services are liable as contributory and
vicarious infringers, even though no statute explicitly endorses
such secondary liability. The results are mixed. The Ninth Circuit,
for example, concluded that the popular filesharing service Napster
could be liable as a contributory infringer as long as it had actual
knowledge of its users' infringing activities.' But the Seventh
Circuit disagreed, concluding that knowledge of infringement was
not itself enough to hold liable a similar service called Aimster.6
The Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit noted, had decided two
decades earlier that Sony was not liable when purchasers of its
Betamax video recorder used it to create infringing copies of
television programs, because the recorder was "widely used for
61 See Viacom Int'l, 676 F.3d at 25-26.
62 Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
The Second Circuit affirmed the court's core legal conclusion, although it took a
different view of the evidence of YouTube's knowledge of specific infringing
videos, and reversed on that basis. See Viacom Int'l, 676 F.3d at 32-34.
63 Graeber, supra note 1, at 193 ("But unlike the Viacom versus YouTube
case, the charges against Megaupload are not civil but criminal; the key players
aren't being sued, they're facing jail. Not for the first time, Kim finds himself
embroiled in a criminal case based on uncertain tech precedent. Does safe
harbor even apply in a criminal case? It's not clear that a criminal statute
against second-party copyright violation even exists. Welcome to the grayest
gray zone on the Internet."); Mantel, supra note 17, at 98 ("Today, the same
charges as those against The Pirate Bay creators would not likely survive against
Google in the United States. This is largely due to the fact that the DMCA
exempts "service providers" from liability [under the safe-harbor provision].")
(internal citations omitted).
64A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
6s In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
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legitimate, unobjectionable purposes."66 But even so, the Seventh
Circuit concluded Aimster could not escape liability by willfully
blinding itself to its users' activities (through encryption software),
especially because there was no evidence that the service was ever
used for legitimate purposes." The Seventh Circuit also expressed
skepticism at the idea that Aimster might be vicariously liable-
like a theater owner held liable for not policing infringing
performers-but noted that sufficient evidence of contributory
infringement, through willful blindness, made the question of
vicarious liability merely academic.
Eventually, the Supreme Court weighed in, concluding
unanimously in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.6 9 that Grokster and Streamcast-services that had sought to
replace Napster in the wake of its litigation woes-could be liable
as secondary infringers even without evidence that they knew
about specific infringing videos.70 The Court emphasized that
these services had shown intent to promote infringement by,
among other things, advertising themselves as alternatives to
Napster and failing to develop filtering tools to curb infringement."
Despite these services' potential many non-infringing uses, this
evidence of intent to encourage infringement, the Court reasoned,
distinguished these services from Sony's Betamax, the last
technology it had addressed regarding secondary infringement.72
66 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650-53.
68 Id. at 654-55.
545 U.S. 913 (2005).
7o Id. at 932-34.
71 Id. at 938-39. The Court observed that "Grokster's name is apparently
derived from Napster." Id. at 939. Although not noted by the Court, Grokster is
an apparent portmanteau of "Grok" and "Napster"; the former is a neologism by
Robert Heinlein meaning "[t]o understand intuitively or by empathy." J.A.
SIMPSON & E.S.C. WEINER, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY VOLUME VI,
864 (2d ed. 1989); see also ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE
LAND 213 (Ace mass-market ed. 1987) ("[IfJ you grok it, understand it so
thoroughly that you merge with it and it merges with you."). Grokster's name
conveyed to fans of Napster that Grokster understood and empathized with
them. Id.
72 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933-35.
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As explained later, this focus on intent causes the standard for
secondary civil copyright liability to approach alignment with the
willfulness standard for criminal copyright culpability.73
It was only a matter of time, then, before federal prosecutors-
buoyed by Grokster's endorsement of secondary liability and
Sweden's successful conviction of The Pirate Bay-sought
criminal penalties for filesharing services. The first of these efforts
began in 2010, as the United States targeted NinjaVideo (a service
as much about direct infringement as secondary), which was
created to showcase collections of infringing content uploaded
by its founder Hana Beshara.74 NinjaVideo collected more than
$500,000 in advertising revenue and donations for providing links
to user-uploaded content-some of it stored on Megaupload's
servers." As part of the NinjaVideo investigation, the Department
of Justice obtained a search warrant for Megaupload-controlled
servers in Virginia, gathering evidence leading to the indictment of
Beshara, who pleaded guilty and was ordered to serve 22 months
in prison and pay $200,000 in restitution.76
The government also pursued the operators of two services-
TVShack.net and channelsurfing.net-that provided links to (often
7 This alignment is particularly acute if, as Professor Timothy Holbrook
argues, Grokster is read to require intent to induce infringement rather than
merely intent to induce the acts. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Symposium
Review, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 408 (2006).
74 Fischer, supra note 9.
7 Timothy B. Lee, How the Criminalization of Copyright Threatens
Innovation and the Rule ofLaw, in COPYRIGHT UNBALANCED: FROM INCENTIVE
To EXCESS 63-64 (Jerry Brito ed., 2012); David Kravets, Megaupload Assisted
U.S. Prosecution of Smaller File-Sharing Service, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2012, 2:54
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/1 l/megaupload-investigation-
roots/.
76 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Leader of NinjaVideo.net Website
Sentenced to 22 Months in Prison for Criminal Copyright Conspiracy (Jan. 6,
2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2012/01/20120106ninjavideonr.
html. Query whether this prosecution primarily served to build a case against
Megaupload is already under investigation by U.S. officials. Kravets, supra
note 75.
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infringing) streaming video of copyrighted television shows." But
as the. Seventh Circuit noted recently, in rejecting a preliminary
injunction against a "social bookmarking" site, myVidster, the
liability of services allowing users to post infringing links to
content hosted by third-parties is a particularly close question,
turning on the extent of the service's contribution to, and intent to
encourage, infringement." Thus, the case against the operator of
channelsurfing.net stalled, and the initially approved extradition of
TVShack.net's British creator faltered on appeal, prompting the
United States to offer deferred prosecution in exchange for him
paying a small fine.79 By that time, however, the government had
mounted its case against Megaupload-a file-hosting rather than
link-listing site-which, according to the indictment, was the "l3th
most frequently visited website on the entire Internet.""
IV. NEW BATTLEGROUNDS: CHALLENGES IN PROSECUTING
FILESHARING SERVICES
This Article now turns to evaluating what this history means
for online filesharing services going forward. Here, the indictment
against Megaupload becomes a valuable guide, serving as a
looking glass into the future of criminal copyright liability for this
type of online business."' The indictment charges the defendants,
as part of a "Mega Conspiracy," with committing six different
federal crimes.8 Two of these crimes derive from allegations that
n Timothy B. Lee, UK TV Shack admin won't face trial in US on copyright
charges, ARs TECHNICA (Nov. 28, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/11/uk-tv-shack-admin-wont-face-trial-in-us-on-copyright-charges/.
Channel Surfing's operator was indicted in 2011, and the case is still ongoing.
Fischer, supra note 9; United States v. McCarthy, 1:11-cr-00900-TPG, ECF
Doc. 15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011).
78 See Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012).
79 See Lee, supra note 75; ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 223.
80 United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-CR-3, ECF Doc. 34, at 2 (E.D. Va. Feb.
16, 2012) [hereinafter Indictment], available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/business/documents/megaupload-indictment.pdf.
81 Id.
82 Id. The six crimes include conspiracy to commit racketeering (18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d) (2012)), conspiracy to commit copyright infringement (id § 371),
conspiracy to commit money laundering (id. § 1956(h)), criminal copyright
infringement by distributing a copyrighted work being prepared for commercial
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the defendants aided and abetted infringers, along with directly
infringing copyright themselves." Others involve conspiracies
flowing from this infringing activity.8 4 Finally, the indictment
charges wire fraud, a white-collar-crime standby, because the
defendants allegedly conned copyright holders into believing their
works were being removed after takedown complaints."
But the true sine qua non of the Megaupload prosecution is
criminal copyright infringement, just as the police told Kim
Dotcom at his arrest." That crime has three elements: (1) willful
(2) infringement (3) for commercial advantage or financial gain."
distribution on a computer network and aiding and abetting of criminal
copyright infringement (id §§ 2, 2319; 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012)), criminal
copyright infringement by electronic means and aiding and abetting of criminal
copyright infringement (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2319; 17 U.S.C. § 506), and fraud by
wire and aiding and abetting of fraud by wire (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343).
83 Indictment, supra note 80, at 71-76. These accusations actually constitute
counts four to eight of the indictment; five to eight allege multiple violations of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2319, and 17 U.S.C. § 506. Indictment, supra note 80, at
71-76.
84 Indictment, supra note 80, at 22-71.
' Id. at 77-80 (these accusations constitute counts nine to thirteen, which
allege five separate violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 134).
6 See supra note 1.
87 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012). The relevant text of the statute:
(a) Criminal infringement.--
(1) In general.--Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall
be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the
infringement was committed--
(A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain;
(B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means,
during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or
more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than
$1,000; or
(C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial
distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible
to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known
that the work was intended for commercial distribution.
Id. As noted supra Part I, copying or distribution of copyrighted works with a
value of more than $1,000 would also satisfy the third element, as would
distribution of a yet-unreleased work being prepared for commercial distribution
(i.e. an unreleased film). See id.; see also 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35,
at § 15.01.
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This section will focus on the interplay of the first two elements;
the former is unique to criminal prosecutions, and the latter
imports to the criminal law most of the defenses to civil liability."
Applying these elements requires applying them to something, and
so it is a worthy diversion to examine just what underlying
infringement the indictment actually alleges.
First, there are charges of direct infringement. The indictment
charges Megaupload employees with uploading copies of
copyrighted works, such as the film "Taken."8 9 The application of
the elements of infringement to that conduct, if proven, will be
straightforward: The government alleges that Megaupload copied
these works for financial gain, with full knowledge that they were
under copyright.o
88 See 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at § 15.01(A).
89 In "Taken," Oscarm-winner Liam Neeson portrays Bryan Mills, a retired
CIA black-ops agent and the father of a kidnapped woman. On the phone with
the kidnappers, Mills tries to dissuade them from taking his daughter:
I don't know who you are. I don't know what you want. If you are
looking for ransom, I can tell you I don't have money. But what I do
have are a very particular set of skills; skills I have acquired over a very
long career. Skills that make me a nightmare for people like you. If
you let my daughter go now, that'll be the end of it. I will not look for
you, I will not pursue you. But if you don't, I will look for you, I will
find you, and I will kill you.
TAKEN (20th Century Fox 2009). Since the film's premiere, the "Taken" speech
has become a popular meme, with people paraphrasing it to dissuade lunch
thieves ("I don't know who you are. I don't know what you want. If you are
looking for cherry cola, I can tell you that I don't have any because some
unscrupulous beast drank mine."), to break up with a passive-aggressive
boyfriend, ("But what you do have are a very particular set of passive-
aggressive skills; skills that make you a nightmare for girlfriends like me."), or
to ban armchair grammarians from their Facebook page ("If you let my
grammatical error go now, that'll be the end of it ... But if you don't, I will hide
you, I will unsubscribe from you, and I will unfriend you."). See Using the
"Taken" Speech In Every Aspect of Your Life, HAPPYPLACE (Oct. 3, 2012),
http://www.happyplace.com/1 8230/how-to-behave-like-liam-neeson-in-taken-
in-every-aspect-of-your-life. In that spirit, this Article offers a caveat to
copyright infringers. Prosecutors may not know who you are, and they may not
have jurisdiction, but what they do have are a very particular set of powers;
powers that include extradition. They will look for you, they will find you, and
they will extradite you.
90 See Indictment, supra note 80, at 49.
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Like Grokster and Napster, the bulk of Megaupload's alleged
infringement liability is secondary; that is, Megaupload is not
charged with committing most of the alleged infringement itself,9 1
but rather with aiding and abetting infringement by others.92 Who,
then, are the actual infringers? At first blush, Megaupload's
viewers might appear to be the infringers because they stream
unlicensed broadcasts of copyrighted content. But each of the
thousands, possibly millions," of unauthorized viewers of copyrighted
works on Megaupload "is no more a copyright infringer than if he
had snuck into a movie theater and watched a copyrighted movie
without buying a ticket."9 4 The only other candidates-the only
other people involved-are the uploaders of the infringing
material. Yet, uploading copyrighted material to a remote server,
an activity widely promoted by technology and media companies
heralding the future of cloud computing, is as much a fair use as is
recording a program for later viewing.9 5
9 Id. at 12 (alleging that a handful of Megaupload employees uploaded
infringing copies of works).
92 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
9 The indictment summarizes the potential breadth of infringing activity on
Megaupload:
Megaupload.com was at one point in its history estimated to be the 13"
most frequently visited website on the entire Internet. The site claims
to have had more than one billion visitors in its history, more than
180,000,000 registered users to date, an average of 50 million daily
visits, and to account for approximately four percent of the total traffic
on the Internet.
Indictment, supra note 80, at 2-3.
94 Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2012). Query
whether Judge Posner's metaphor of sneaking into a movie theater withstands
closer inspection. The actual performance in this case, as well as in Flava
Works, is started and stopped not by the uploader (or, in that case, the copyright
holder) but by the person streaming the video. Why should the uploader be
directly liable, as opposed to secondarily liable, for an infringing performance
started and stopped by someone else? But whatever the answer, someone has
violated the copyright holder's right of performance, and Megaupload stands
accused of encouraging uploaders and viewers alike.
9 See Sony Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir.
2003).
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Although copying a work onto a remote server alone would not
be a crime, copying is not the only exclusive right of copyright
holders; they also have the exclusive right of performance, which
includes broadcasts of audiovisual works.96 So, it is not the uploader's
copying but their sharing of the stored file with others that violates
the copyright act, and that is the primary infringement that
Megaupload is alleged to have aided and abetted.97
A few commentators have argued that there should be no
criminal liability for filesharing services for the copyright
infringement of their users. Their argument treats the
prosecution's theory-to the extent it seeks to hold the Mega-
conspirators liable for conduct other than their own infringing
uploads-as an overextension of the doctrine of secondary
infringement endorsed by the Supreme Court in Grokster." To
some extent, this position reflects hostility to the strength of United
States copyright protections generally, rather than a principled
distinction between Grokster and the Megaupload prosecution.
But there is some substance to the argument that judges are free to
create various theories of liability in civil law, but not in criminal
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012); 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at
§ 8.14; Flava Works, Inc., 689 F.3d at 758 ("The right to control copying is not
the only exclusive right of a copyright owner. That would make life too simple
for us.").
9 Although the indictment charges Megaupload with secondary liability for
"distribution," a right codified in § 106(3), it is inapplicable to Megaupload
unless the works were downloaded, as opposed to streamed. "Downloading"
creates a permanent copy of the video file on the computer's hard drive.
"Streaming" is a process by which a computer makes a temporary "buffer" copy
of a video file, which is destroyed as the video is played. See JOHN C. DVORAK,
CHRIS PIRILLO & WENDY TAYLOR, ONLINE! THE BOOK 399 (2003). If the
government intends to prove infringement by "distribution," then the primary
infringers would be the individuals who downloaded copies.
98 Lee, supra note 75, at 67-70 (arguing that secondary liability should not be
extended in the criminal context because the doctrine has been fleshed out by
the courts not Congress); Jennifer Granick, Megaupload: A Lot Less Guilty Than
You Think, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY BLOG (Jan. 26, 2012,
11:47 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/01/megaupload-lot-less-
guilty-you-think ("But the first question from a defense perspective has to be
'Can the Grokster theory of CIVIL liability even be the basis for CRIMINAL
copyright claims?' This has never been decided by any Court.").
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law.99 In fact, the rule of lenity reflects a judicial willingness to
find exceptions to liability in criminal law. 10 So where can
"vicarious," "contributory," or "inducement" liability be found in
the statute?
All of these civil liability theories fall under the umbrella term
of "secondary liability" and correlate with variants of "aiding and
abetting" under 18 U.S.C. § 2.' As the Seventh Circuit noted in
Aimster, Sony treats "vicarious and contributory infringement
interchangeably."'O2 Although Grokster purports to give the two
terms distinct definitions, postulating that a person "infringes
contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct
infringement and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit
it."'0o But the decision strips away this definitional clarity in a
footnote, quoting Sony's conclusion that " 'the lines between direct
infringement, contributory infringement and vicarious liability
are not clearly drawn.' "'04 On top of that, the Supreme Court
99 See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 48 (2008) (positing that even
most legalists are "willing to allow common law judges (and almost all
American judges have a common law as well as a statutory and constitutional
jurisdiction) to overrule and distinguish precedents and create new common law
rules and standards"); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTs 319 (2012)
(distinguishing judge-made, policy-driven changes to the common law from
changes of the same ilk to statutory law, and finding only the former
permissible).
'oo See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1048 (7th Cir. 2012)
("We mustn't forget the rule of lenity in the interpretation of criminal statutes, or
the words of the great nineteenth-century English jurist of criminal law James
Fitzjames Stephen: 'Before an act can be treated as a crime, it ought . . . to be of
such nature that it is worthwhile to prevent it at the risk of inflicting great
damage, direct and indirect, upon those who commit it. "') (citations omitted);
see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 99, at 296-302 (advocating application
of rule of lenity as a "canon of construction").
lo See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The statute actually covers much more than
"aiding and abetting," and this Article uses the phrase as shorthand for all of the
conduct covered in § 2. See id
102 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
103 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930
(2005) (internal citations omitted).
'O'Id n.9.
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concluded that it need not analyze the question of vicarious
liability because it was resolving the case "based on an inducement
theory.""o' To avoid this confusion, this Article lumps together
vicarious, contributory, or induced infringement as different
permutations of a single claim of "secondary liability."'o6
Because aiding and abetting is the criminal corollary to
secondary liability,"o' this Article proposes that the two concepts
should cover the same conduct. All of the variant theories of
secondary liability boil down to intentionally encouraging others to
infringe, or helping them to do so. In the criminal context, that
same conduct is referred to as aiding and abetting. And unlike
vicarious, contributory, or inducement liability, aiding and abetting
is a creature of statute,' so no common law theories of liability are
required.
But prosecuting Megaupload (or anyone else) for aiding and
abetting copyright infringement requires defining precisely what
activity the government must prove that a filesharing service aided.
One approach would be to make the government prove that the
underlying infringement was also criminal, meeting the same
standard of willfulness. That would force the government to prove
that at least one user willfully and for commercial advantage
105 1d,
1o6 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 740, 775 (2013) (book review) ("Through a common law process, courts
have developed three different theories of secondary liability: one for
contributory infringement, one for vicarious liability, and one for inducing
infringement."); Jay Dratler, Jr., Common-Sense (Federal) Common Law Adrift
in a Statutory Sea, or Why Grokster was a Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 413, 437 (2006) ("If it were up to me, I
would junk all the terms 'inducement,' 'vicarious liability' and 'contributory
infringement' in referring to a legal cause of action and use a single, consistent
term-'secondary liability'-for all claims of this kind.").
107 In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651 ("There are analogies in the law of aiding
and abetting, the criminal counterpart to contributory infringement."); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting); Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, The Moral of the Story: What Grokster
Has to Teach About the DMCA, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 6, 43-46 (2011); cf
Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing a
secondary infringer as "roughly an infringer's accomplice").
108 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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infringed a copyright. The government would not have to convict
anyone of that underlying infringement in order to convict
operators of a filesharing service, but it would have to prove that
the infringement happened. Think of prosecuting someone for
aiding and abetting a bank robbery: Prosecutors must prove the
robbery happened, even if they never prosecute the actual robber.'09
And a good defense attorney will argue that part of the crime of
robbery is intent, just as part of the crime of copyright
infringement is willfulness. So, does the government have to
prove that unnamed users "willfully" infringed the uploaded
works, in addition to proving that operators of a filesharing service
willfully aided them?
Although some copyright scholars have latched onto this
dubious theory,' the answer is clearly "No." Criminal law is not
an endless fractal of intent, delving down and down like Alice's
rabbit hole. Once again, it helps to think of aiding and abetting a
crime in the "analog" world, such as robbery. Others have been
quick to point out that driving a robber to a bank is not a crime if
the driver has no knowledge of the robbery."' But the reverse also
holds: If someone drives the Joker"2 to Gotham Bank knowing
109 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 806 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986)
("The government correctly points out that a defendant can be convicted of
aiding and abetting even if a principal is never identified or convicted.
Nonetheless, a defendant cannot be criminally convicted absent proof that a
principal criminal offense was committed.") (internal citations omitted).
no See, e.g., Rick Sanders, Megaupload: Legal Obstacle Course for
Prosecutors: Copyright, AARON SANDERS PLLC (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://www.aaronsanderslaw.com/blog/megaupload-legal-obstacle-course-for-
prosecutors-copyright.
"' See id. ("If your buddy just asked you for a ride to the bank ... , you
wouldn't be aiding and abetting the bank robbery.").
112 Although in this hypothetical the Joker (clown-faced nemesis of comic-
book hero Batman) is robbing a bank, he is also no stranger to copyright
crime-although of an unusual kind. The Joker once dumped chemicals into
Gotham Bay that mutated all of the fish; these mutant fish wore toothy grins
with white faces-reminiscent of the Joker's own face. Dubbing them "Joker
Fish," the Joker plotted to get rich by copyrighting them and earning a royalty
from every fish stick. But when he broke into the office of the Commissioner of
Copyright, the Commissioner refused to register his work, insisting: "Nobody
can copyright fish--or even fish faces! They're a natural resource!" The Joker
122 VOL. 15: 101
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that he will commit a robbery, but the Joker is acquitted by reason
of insanity, his inability to understand the consequences of his
actions does not acquit the driver."3 Returning to the digital world
of online copyright infringement, if operators of a filesharing
service willfully assist users in infringement, the users' subjective
belief that their uploads are a fair use (if they indeed hold such a
belief) would not protect the services' operators" 4 -Nor should it.
Otherwise, ignorance of the primary infringer would be a shield,
and cunning criminals could use the nalive as unwitting tools of
crime.
The challenges to extending "secondary liability" to criminal
copyright law are overblown. Although Megaupload may have a
stronger defense, as discussed herein, the allegations that
Megaupload knowingly assisted widespread infringement for profit
would, if proven, easily constitute criminal aiding and abetting of
that infringement.
Allegations are not proof, however, and the government will
have a high bar to clear. To win its case against Megaupload, the
government must prove the same facts required for a civil lawsuit,
but it must prove them beyond a reasonable doubt (as opposed to
the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence), and it must
prove that the infringement was willful and for commercial gain."'
Because the government must prove the same facts (plus one
more-willfulness), most of the same defenses available in a civil
lawsuit are also available in a criminal prosecution, including fair
was unmoved: "But the fish share my unique face! If colonel what's-his-name
can have chickens, when they don't even have mustaches--! And you deny this
to me! You see why I am forced to crime!" See Steve Englehart & Marshall
Rogers, The Laughing Fish!, BATMAN'S DETECTIVE COMICS 475, at 9-10 (DC
Comics Feb. 1978).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2012).
114 Chris Dodd, head of the Motion Picture Association of America, has used a
similar analogy in discussing search engines' potential liability for copyright
infringement: "How do you justify a search engine providing for someone to go
and steal something? A guy that drives the getaway car didn't rob the bank
necessarily, but they got you to the bank and they got you out of it, so they are
accessories in my view." ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 219.
115 Or, as noted, the value of the works infringed in a six-month period
exceeded $1,000. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2012).
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use, implied license, and abandonment of copyright. A handful of
defenses available in civil actions are, however, inapplicable to
criminal prosecution-most notably, the failure to register a work
with the copyright office and the DMCA's safe harbor.
The availability of defenses in civil suits that are unavailable in
criminal prosecutions runs counter to common sense. At first
glance, it seems unfair that a filesharing service could be
criminally prosecuted for acts that do not warrant civil liability.
Indeed, the preeminent copyright treatise, Nimmer on Copyright,
has even declared such a prosecution impossible: "Conduct that
does not give rise to civil liability for copyright infringement
cannot constitute criminal infringement either."ll 6 But an examination
of these defenses demonstrates why they are inapplicable to criminal
cases-and why this should not be troubling.
The first defense applicable only to civil actions is failure to
register a work. Although Congress no longer requires registration
before copyright protection applies, no civil action may be brought
(except for rights of attribution) until a work has been registered."'
But the statute instituting this limitation says nothing of criminal
sanctions, and this was no drafting error. Congress intentionally
eliminated the registration hurdle in criminal cases through the
2008 PRO-IP Act,'18 making it easier to enforce copyright criminally
than civilly. Congress's reasoning, as memorialized in the house
report corresponding to the PRO-IP Act, was that the
blameworthiness of infringement does not depend upon
registration, because "[t]he lack of a registration does not make the
116 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at § 15.01(A)(2).
"' 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012) ("[N]o civil action for infringement of the
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.").
118 Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256; see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); 4
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at § 15.07. Before the amendment, it was an
open question whether § 411 applied to criminal and civil actions. See Michael
M. DuBose, Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Laws in the Twenty-
First Century, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 481, 488 (2006) ("[W]hether or not the
term 'action' in § 411 includes criminal prosecutions is a highly relevant
question for today's prosecutors. Unfortunately, there is no reported decision
addressing the issue in the context of the current copyright statutes.").
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criminal activity any less egregious."" 9 But that rationale applies
with equal force to civil actions; as an explanation, it is
incomplete.
One piece of a more complete answer is that criminal
enforcement is aimed at infringement that may never be the subject
of civil actions. For example, foreign works do not have to register
to obtain copyright protection, but the government would still want
to police against their infringement.120 And criminal infringement
can involve a slew of different works, some registered, some not.
Many works carry a pre-registration problem. A draft memoir, 2'
or early cut of an anticipated movie,122 or even works never intended
for publication at all'23 may be particularly attractive to infringers
despite their unregistered status. Also, criminal infringers might
copy many works-think mass production of DVDs-and the
government's interest in punishing that infringement does not vary
when some works are registered and others are not.
That last point is the most crucial: The public has a different
interest in criminal prosecution than an author has in civil
enforcement. The desire to enforce obedience to the laws is very
different than an author's desire for compensation for their works.
Given the benefits of copyright law to authors, requiring authors to
take the beneficial step of registering their works before they can
"9 H.R. Rep. No. 110-617, at 23 (2008).
120 See Tyler T. Ochoa, Is the Copyright Public Domain Irrevocable? An
Introduction to Golan v. Holder, 64 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 123, 127-28
(2011) (discussing enforcement of copyright for foreign works).
121 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter's, 471 U.S. 539,
547-48 (1985) (holding registration of President Ford's memoir required for
civil suit, though it had not yet been published, when news magazine copied key
excerpts).
122 To address this problem for the movie industry, Congress created a
preregistration regime in 17 U.S.C. § 408(f) (2012) to preserve a right to
statutory damages when an unpublished (and incomplete) work has been
infringed. See Sleep Sci. Partners v. Lieberman, 09-04200 CW, 2010 WL
1881770, at 6 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010) (noting that Congress, in enacting
preregistration, was "concerned, in large part, with the piracy of movies").
123 See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 93 (2d. Cir. 1987)
(noting that author was forced to register copyright in unpublished letters to
prevent their publication), supplemented on denial of reh'g, 818 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1987).
125OCT. 2013]
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
reap these benefits is equitable and efficient. But no interest is
served in requiring the government to persuade rights-holders to
register their works before prosecuting criminals. The attachment
of copyright at the moment of creation-not the moment of
registration-would be a fiction if enforcement of copyright were
impossible absent registration.
As a practical matter, however, most criminal prosecutions will
focus on infringement of registered works. 124 This is especially so
because an element of infringement is that the work used be under
copyright of another,125 and registration is the most expeditious
way to prove a valid copyright. 126 While the author's failure to
register copyright is not a defense against criminal prosecution, it
is a means to cast doubt upon authorship.
The second defense applicable only to civil actions is the safe
harbor of the DMCA. That provision shields Internet service
providers like Megaupload from suits for "monetary relief, or ...
injunctive or other equitable relief."1 27 The provision says nothing
about criminal sanctions. Much ink has been spilled speculating
about the effect of that omission and whether Megaupload will
attempt to use the DMCA's safe harbor as a defense against the
Department of Justice.128
As it turns out, the safe harbor is a red herring. 129 Despite
concerns expressed by observers, 30 the DMCA's safe harbor
124 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at § 15.01(A)(2).
125 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012), invalidated on other grounds by Nat'l Ass'n of
Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297
(11th Cir. 2011).
126 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012) ("In any judicial proceedings the certificate
of a registration . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the
copyright. . . .").
127 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
128 See, e.g., Graeber, supra note 1, at 193.
129 The use of "red herring" to mean a diversion or false trail likely originated
from a tale by Michael Quinion, who trained his dogs to hunt by dragging a
"red" herring (so called because the smoking and salting process turned the meat
red) behind him; red herrings were known to be especially pungent, and the
scent would have been easy for a dog to follow. See 11 WILLIAM COBBETT ET
AL., COBBETT'S POLITICAL REGISTER 232 (London 1807). The idiomatic use of
"red herring" to mean a false trail became a recurring joke in A Pup Named
126 VOL. 15: 101
Criminal Filesharing Services
provision will not feature prominently in the Megaupload
prosecution, nor any other. To understand why, keep in mind that
the safe harbor provision (the particular one for which most
filesharing services are eligible, as there are several in the DMCA)
has three elements: (1) lack of knowledge or awareness of
infringement; (2) lack of financial benefit from infringement under
defendant's control; and (3) expeditious response to requests to
remove infringing material."' The common parlance for the third
element is "notice and takedown,"' 32 and several companies-such
as YouTube-have successfully defended against civil suits in part
by demonstrating their notice and takedown compliance.' But the
popular focus on the third element, the expeditious compliance
Scooby-Doo, as the crime-solving dog and his friends always suspected a ne'er-
do-well named "Red Herring." See, e.g., ABC television broadcast, A Pup
Named Scooby-Doo: A Bicycle Built for Boo! (Sept. 10, 1988).
130 See Mantel, supra note 17, at 98.
13 The relevant statute provides:
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users.--
(1) In general.--A service provider shall not be liable for monetary
relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other
equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage
at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service
provider--
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right
and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
132 See, e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir.
2012) (explaining notification "commonly known as a 'takedown notice' ").
1 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976, 980-82 (9th Cir.
2011); see also supra Part III (discussing the YouTube case).
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with notice and takedown, neglects the first: lack of knowledge or
awareness of infringement. This is a subset of the first element of
a criminal prosecution: willfulness.
In fact, the willfulness requirement provides even more
protection than the DMCA's safe harbor. Courts have disagreed
about exactly what constitutes "willful" infringement, but at a
minimum the infringer must know that they are copying or
performing a work (or in cases of secondary liability, aiding and
abetting others in copying or performing). 1' Because willful
infringement cannot be done without knowledge or awareness of
infringement, anyone who satisfied the first element of DMCA's
safe harbor would have already defeated a criminal prosecution.'
But if a site's owners are aware of infringing files, no matter how
quickly they comply with notice and takedown requests, they
cannot take advantage of the safe harbor provision. Yet these
owners with knowledge might be able to defeat a criminal
prosecution if they can prove that they were ignorant of their
infringement, despite knowing their actions; i.e., that they were not
"willful."
The most famous example of intentional but still-innocent
infringement is that of Dennis Moran, a mom-and-pop video rental
storeowner and police officer. "' The FBI arrested Moran for
making a single copy of "Crocodile Dundee II," amongst other
movies, and then renting the copies in lieu of the originals.'
When federal agents arrived, Moran led them directly to the
originals of the copied movies and told the agents exactly what
he'd been doing. He believed his copying was perfectly legal, so
long as he made only one copy of each video cassette. In a bench
trial, the judge acquitted Moran, finding that his infringement was
not "willful." Moran was unsophisticated, cooperated with police,
and purchased multiple copies of the same movie rather than make
more than one copy of each video."' Although Moran shifted the
risk of loss for each video from himself to the copyright owner, he
134 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 35, at § 15.01.
135 See, e.g., Graeber, supra note 1, at 193.
136 United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb. 1991).
137 Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1052.
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believed, erroneously but honestly, that this was a permitted fair
use.139
The Moran case has inspired what this Article terms the
"Tinker Bell defense:"1 40 If people believe that their actions do not
violate copyright laws, they can never be convicted of criminal
copyright infringement. That argument has become an unfortunate
darling of legal academia.' 4 ' This argument represents a case of
literal wishful thinking-but opponents to criminal copyright
cannot wish the law away.
There is a crucial difference between someone who does not
know that his actions are wrong, like Moran, and someone who
knows his actions are wrong but believes that he has found a gap in
the law that he can exploit. The latter constitutes willfulness even
if honestly believed. For example, a recurring argument raised by
pro se criminal defendants is that the statute giving federal district
courts original jurisdiction in criminal cases, 18 U.S.C. § 3231
(2012), was improperly enacted and thus all federal criminal
prosecutions are illegal. That argument has been thoroughly
'
3 9 Id. Moran is an extreme case and represents the most stringent willfulness
standard applied in a criminal context. See 5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
35, at § 15.01(2). Other courts have held that infringement is willful when the
infringer intends their actions, even if the defendant erroneously believes their
acts are not infringing. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533 (2d
Cir. 1943).
140 Tinker Bell is a fairy from the children's play "Peter Pan." In the play,
Tinker Bell (portrayed as a bright spot of light) drinks poison meant for Peter,
saving his life. The fairy nearly succumbs to the deadly poison, but tells the
audience (through Peter, the only one who can understand her speech, which is
depicted as tinkling bells) that she will get better "if children believe in fairies."
Peter urges the audience, "Do you believe in fairies? . . . If you believe, clap
your hands!" See J.M. BARRIE, PETER PAN, act 4 (1904). The audience's
applause then revives Tinker Bell. See id.
141 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Comments on the Megaupload Prosecution (a
Long-Delayed Linkwrap), TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/04/megaupload.htm ("Megaupload's
business choices may not have been ideal, but Megaupload has a number of
strong potential defenses for its users' activities, including 512(c), lack of
volitional conduct and more. Whether it actually qualified for these is
irrelevant; Megaupload's subjective belief in these defenses should destroy the
willfulness requirement.").
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discredited,'4 2 but many defendants, nonetheless, honestly believe
it-should that belief defeat the "willfulness" requirement in
criminal copyright cases?
The answer must be "No." The willfulness requirement exists
to protect the accidental infringer, not the Holmesian "bad man."l4 3
After all, the "bad man" is motivated to learn the law only in order
to avoid entanglement with it; were he told that by dint of his own
belief he could render himself immune to prosecution, he would
never learn the law at all, or learn it wrong on purpose, and
certainly never obey it unless it suited him.'" That cannot be right.
Instead, defendants who knowingly aid or abet the infringement of
copyright are not any less "willful" for believing that a flaw in the
statute protects them. And a filesharing service that .knows its
users are infringing upon copyrighted works but erroneously
believes that it may qualify for the DMCA safe harbor by taking
down infringing videos and then reposting them is just as "willful"
as a defendant who intentionally commits a crime but believes that
no court will have jurisdiction to try him.
In Megaupload's case, its strongest defense against the charges
may indeed be a lack of willfulness-if Megaupload honestly
believed that it was effectively policing against infringing
content-then it is not guilty of aiding and abetting criminal
142 See, e.g., Mims v. United States, No. 9:06CV 166, 2006 WL 2559534 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 1, 2006); Derleth v. United States, No. L-05-205, 2006 WL 1804618
(S.D. Tex. June 27, 2006); United States v. Risquet, 426 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.
Pa. 2006); Jones v. Unknown Warden, No 4:06CV00082 (ERW), 2006 WL
389833 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 17, 2006); United States v. Lawrence, No. 02 CR 200,
2006 WL 250702 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2006).
143 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459
(1897) ("[A] bad man has as much reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an
encounter with the public force, and therefore you can see the practical
importance of the distinction between morality and law. A man who cares
nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors is
likely nevertheless to care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and
will want to keep out ofjail if he can.").
'4See id. ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it
as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience.").
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copyright infringement. Commentaters argue that Megaupload's
"subjective belief' that it complied with the safe harbor provision
will defeat the willfulness requirement,'45 but as discussed earlier,
if Megaupload fails to qualify for the safe harbor, it will be
because the government proves that Megaupload knew about the
infringing content (and if the government does not, Megaupload
will surely be acquitted of the aiding and abetting charge). The
mistaken belief that one is immune from prosecution for aiding and
abetting conduct one knows is illegal does not disprove willfulness.
For the reason stated above, if the facts alleged in the
indictment are proved, the willfulness requirement will likely be
met. According to the indictment, the operators of Megaupload
were just as intentional in their copyright infringement as The
Pirate Bay, collecting advertising revenues generated by infringing
content and exchanging incriminating emails showing that they
knew about the infringement on their service. 146 One operator
joked to another that they "have a funny business . . . modem days
pirates :)," to which his co-conspirator responded, "we're not
pirates, we're just providing shipping services to pirates :)."
Megaupload similarly sold premium access to unlimited streaming
of uploaded content and financially rewarded users-even those
115 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 141 ("Megaupload's subjective belief in
these defenses should destroy the willfulness requirement.").
146 See Indictment, supra note 80, at 3, 42.
147 Id. at 42. In another exchange, Kim Dotcom sent an employee an email
from a broadband service provider, which had complained that its users were
having trouble downloading content from Megaupload.com. Id. The indictment
says that the screenshots in the email appeared to be an ongoing download of an
episode of the television series "The Simpsons" entitled "Treehouse of Horror
XIII." Id. Unfortunately, Megaupload failed to learn that episode's moral about
the dangers of unauthorized copying. See id In the segment "Send in the
Clones," Homer (the patriarch of the eponymous family) buys a hammock with
a terrible curse: It clones anyone who uses it. The Simpsons: Treehouse of
Horror XII, "Send in the Clones " (FOX Television Broadcast, 2002). Homer
clones himself several times, but finds that the cloned Homers get him into
trouble. Id. He abandons them and the hammock in a distant town, but the
clones begin some unauthorized copying of their own, making an army of
Homer clones that overrun Springfield. Id. Copyright infringers, take note:
When the federal government gets involved at the segment's end, things end
badly for the unauthorized copiers. See id.
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previously caught uploading infringing material-for uploading
popular content and for posting links to that same content on other
websites. 148 This practice not only increased traffic but also
allowed Megaupload to avoid listing infringing videos directly on
the site, concealing the scope of the infringing content on its
servers. "' To rebut claims of infringement, Megaupload had
instituted an "Abuse Tool," allowing copyright holders to report,
and purportedly remove, infringing content. But the indictment
alleges that the company received millions of requests to remove
infringing content and, "at best, only deleted the particular URL of
which the copyright holder complained, and purposefully left the
actual infringing copy of the copyrighted work on the Mega
Conspiracy-controlled server and allowed access to the infringing
work to continue."o50
If these allegations are true, Megaupload is likely subject to not
only criminal but civil liability, as well. And, in fact, the company
was sued by pornography company Perfect 10 even before the
Department of Justice stepped in."' The case brought by Perfect
10, however, was short-lived. It settled early in the proceeding
after the district court denied Megaupload's motion to dismiss.'52
The court reasoned that, if the plaintiff's allegations were true, any
lack of knowledge on Megaupload's part about the infringement
on its site was willful blindness."
148 Indictment, supra note 80, at 6-7, 32-33.
149 Id. at 6-7.
0 d. at 10- 11.
'5s Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload, Ltd., No. 3:11-cv-00191, ECF Doc. 16, at
9 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011).
152 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload, Ltd., No. 3:11-cv-00191, ECF Doc. 27
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (dismissing case with prejudice under FED. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)).
'5 Id. Because Megaupload settled the lawsuit, it probably cannot seek
contribution from any users who may have been the direct infringers, even if it
faced only secondary liability. See, e.g., Jeremiah Newhall, Claims for
Contribution Against Nonsettling Co-Tortfeasors, 26 C.B.A, REC., no.5, at 40-
41 (2012). Since the prosecution, two music companies have sought millions in
damages from Megaupload, but their suit is stayed pending further
developments in the criminal case. Jeremy Kirk, Megaupload Files Motion to
Delay Civil Suit, PCWORLD, (May 10, 2012, 6:20 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/255423/megaupload-files-motion-to-delay_ci
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V. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: WHEN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IS
WARRANTED
Even with the high bar of willfulness, there are almost certainly
more filesharing services subject to criminal liability than can be
prosecuted. Since the time filesharing services first became
mainstream, technological developments have made them easier to
create, and millions of people have shown themselves willing to
skirt the law to share music online.'54 Consider, for instance, that a
2011 study concluded that, in the United States alone, "17.53% of
Internet traffic was estimated to be infringing," excluding
pornography.'5 1 Yet in 2012, the Department of Justice received
only 79 investigative matters related to copyright infringement of
any kind under 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012) and filed only 40 cases
against 59 defendants.'56
vil_suit.html; Microhits, Inc. v. Megaupload, Ltd., No. 1:12-cv-00327, ECF
Doc. 36 (E.D. Va. June 15, 2012) (denying plaintiffs motion to reconsider an
earlier-imposed stay). Interestingly, it was actually Megaupload that was the
more aggressive litigator, suing Universal Music Group for allegedly unlawfully
removing from YouTube a video showcasing music stars endorsing
Megaupload. Eriq Gardner, Megaupload Drops Lawsuit Against Universal
Music Over Viral Video (Exclusive), THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 21,
2012, 10:18 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/megaupload-
universal-music-group-lawsuit-dropped-283767. This lawsuit was dismissed
without prejudice in January 2012. Id. The video featured endorsements from
artists William Adams ("will.i.am"), Jamie Foxx, Kanye West, Sean Combs
("Diddy"), Jonathan Smith ("Lil Jon"), Chris Brown, and professional celebrity
Kim Kardashian. OKFocus, MEGA UPLOAD SONG!!!! HTTP://OKFOC.US,
VIMEO (Dec. 9, 2011), http://vimeo.com/33424808.
154 See ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 191, 201. These concerns lead to what
journalist Nate Anderson calls the "unique scale problem" posed by copyright
since the creation of the Internet. Id. at 191. Anderson suggests, however, that
the government may be the "one entity" with "the brawn to force Internet
providers to take action against their users." Id. at 207.
1 ENVISIONAL LTD., AN ESTIMATE OF INFRINGING USE ON THE INTERNET 3
(2011), available at http://documents.envisional.com/docs/Envisional-
Internet Usage-Jan201 1.pdf. Why exclude pornography? The infringing status
can be "difficult to discern." Id. at 2.
'
56 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2012 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT app. D, at D-3 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT].
The trend has been similar in years past: In 2011, of 82 investigative matters,
only 46 cases were filed; in 2010, it was 74 cases out of 132. See U.S. DEP'T OF
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
Any potential increase in criminal copyright enforcement,
however, faces unique challenges even aside from proving a case,
for two reasons. First, anti-copyright advocates can be a vocal
group in the United States, ready to incite public backlash.
Megaupload, for example, garnered the support of important
Internet personalities ranging from respected entrepreneur Steve
Wozniak, '" co-founder of Apple Computers, to the notorious
hacker group Anonymous,"' which mounted attacks following the
JUSTICE, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT app. D, at D-3
(2012); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT app. E, at E-3 (2011). This data includes all types of copyright
infringers, not just Internet infringers. See 2012 ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT at
D-1.
157 Aaron Souppouris, Steve Wozniak Speaks Out In Favor of Net Neutrality,
Supports Megaupload, THE VERGE (June 27, 2012, 8:02 AM),
http://www.theverge.com/2012/6/27/3120355/steve-wozniak-net-neutrality-
megaupload-support.
158 More deserves to be said about the "group" Anonymous, which has its
origins in a copyright dispute with the Church of Scientology. Simply put, there
is no evidence of a capital-A "anonymous" entity, but only of anonymous
individuals who commit acts ascribed to "Anonymous." There is little or no
evidence of central coordination or that most of the purported "members" know,
or even agree with, one another. In this sense, it is more akin to a mass
movement, a la the Occupy Wall Street protests. The Anonymous legend
appears to have its origins in a report by a local news team for the Los Angeles
Fox television affiliate, which described "a hacker group called Anonymous."
But as online magazine Wired explained, "Fox 11 actually stumbled across the
/b/ (NSFW) channel of 4chan" (or possibly 420chan) an "image sharing and
posting site where every poster posts as Anonymous. Here, supremely bored
15-year olds post obscene pictures and stupid photo-shopped images for others
to comment on. They also randomly swarm and try to overwhelm online sites
and forums they consider annoying." See Ryan Singel, Investigative Report
Reveals Hackers Terrorize the Internet for LULZ, WIRED (July 27, 2007, 3:54
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/07/investigative-r/. The first
instance of anyone publicly claiming to act for "Anonymous" as a group came
in the form of a press release posted (anonymously) through free press-release
generator PRlog.org, and heralding a denial-of-service attack against the Church
of Scientology in January 2008. Internet Group Anonymous Declares "War on
Scientology," PRLOG (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.prlog.org/10046797-internet-
group-anonymous-declares-war-on-scientology.html. The author of the press
release found the church's use of copyright to prevent publication and criticism
of its teachings to be objectionable, especially when the church issued takedown
notices to web sites hosting a video of a Tom Cruise interview about the church.
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indictment that briefly disabled several government and
music-industry websites"' Second, it is very difficult to prosecute
infringers who often live outside of the United States and operate
conspiracies that span across the globe. Barely 10% of Internet
users are in the United States,' and many Internet service providers
have spread their operations across multiple jurisdictions, as
Megaupload did: The company was based in Hong Kong, but had
servers in the United States and elsewhere, and its operators were
captured in both Europe and New Zealand.''
Given these challenges, prosecutors should save their powder
for when criminal prosecution is most necessary, rather than firing
Id. Shortly thereafter, a number of protests against the church arose, at which
people wore Guy Fawkes masks based on the mask worn by protagonist "V" in
the graphic novel and film "V for Vendetta," in which a masked terrorist blows
up Parliament and inspires a horde of imitators. See generally ALAN MOORE
AND DAVID LLOYD, V FOR VENDETTA (DC Comics 1982) (depicting a
mysterious masked revolutionary who calls himself "V" and works to destroy
the totalitarian government in a post-nuclear UK); V FOR VENDETTA (Warner
Bros. 2005) (adapting the 1982 graphic novel for the screen).
1 Josh Halliday, Anonymous Launches Attacks in Wake of Megaupload
Closure, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2012, 8:52 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
technology/2012/jan/20/anonymous-attacks-after-megauploads-closure.
Recently, open-information activists have turned their attention to Aaron
Swartz, who committed suicide in the midst of federal prosecution for his role in
obtaining academic articles from the online database JSTOR that he apparently
planned to distribute for free. Caroline Bankoff, Aaron Swartz 's Suicide Spurs
Outrage at Prosecutors, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Jan. 13, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://
nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/swartzs-suicide-spurs-outrage-at-
prosecutors. html.
Iolnternet Users - Top 20 Countries - Internet Usage, INTERNET WORLD
STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/top20.htm (last updated Mar. 6,
2013).
161 Nick Perry, Popular File-sharing Website Megaupload Shut Down,
USATODAY.COM (Jan. 20, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
tech/news/story/2012-01-19/megaupload-feds-shutdown/52678528/1
(describing the company as "based in Hong Kong"). As a reporter who visited
Dotcom after the indictment noted, the Megaupload conspirators made their
homes all over the globe: "Andrus Nomm, a resident of both Turkey and
Estonia, was captured in Holland; Sven Echtemach escaped to his home in
Germany (which does not extradite its citizens); and Julius Bencko of Slovakia
remains at large. The other three were, like Kim, nabbed in New Zealand."
Graeber, supra note 1.
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at will whenever an infringing website comes within their
jurisdiction. This suggestion of prosecutorial discretion, however,
requires a brief discussion of the limits of that discretion before
turning to specific guidelines for enforcement of copyright law.
A. The Limits ofProsecutorial Discretion
Federal prosecutors were once afforded significant discretion
in deciding whether to bring charges against alleged criminals.16 2
But beginning in 2003 Attorney General John Ashcroft amended
the rules to create a straightforward approach to prosecutorial
discretion; there wasn't any.' United States Attorneys were required
to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or
162 Michael A. Caves, The Prosecutor's Dilemma: Obligatory Charging
Under the Ashcroft Memo, 9 J. L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 1, 1 (2008) ("Prior to
former-Attorney General Ashcroft's Memo, federal prosecutors were afforded
wide discretion when deciding whether to charge a suspect with a crime because
of the significant impact that criminal charges can have on a suspect.").
163 Memorandum from John Ashcroft to all federal prosecutors (Sept. 22,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.
htm; see also Caves, supra note 162, at 2 ("After then-Attorney General John
Ashcroft's memo, federal prosecutors were required to charge the most serious,
readily provable offense supported by the facts of the case, without regard for
any overarching notions of justice."). We slightly overstate the reality. The
memo could not eliminate prosecutorial discretion as completely as it intended:
it still remained for the U.S. Attorney to decide whether an offense was
"supported by the facts of the case," an objective standard, but one pliable
enough that a sympathetic prosecutor could decline to pursue charges in an
extreme case. Consider the hypothetical of John McClane, a New York City
police officer who, while visiting his estranged wife at her office's holiday party
in Los Angeles's Nakatomi Plaza, encounters a group of international terrorists
who take his wife and her work colleagues hostage. See DIE HARD (20th
Century Fox 1988). McClane knows that he is not allowed to possess a machine
gun. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2012); see also United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d
273, 283 (3d Cir. 1996) (Slovitar, C.J.) (upholding the constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. § 922(o)). Nonetheless McClane kills a terrorist, takes his machine gun,
and rescues his wife and all of the hostages (except for Harry Ellis). See DIE
HARD. A U.S. Attorney would be obliged to prosecute McClane under this
policy, but might nonetheless decline to prosecute, arguing (implausibly) that
the charge of possession of a machine gun was not "supported by the facts of the
case." Of course, McClane has a very plausible defense of necessity, but the
elements of the charge are nonetheless present.
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offenses that are supported by the facts of the case."'" This kind
of strict adherence to the letter of the law calls to mind Inspector
Javert's pursuit of Jean Vaijean. It springs from a philosophy of
legal fidelity that regards prosecutorial discretion as
antidemocratic. Under this view, Congress enacts the law
according to the will of the people, and appointed judges and
prosecutors should stringently enforce those laws.' 5 If the law is
unjust, its rigid enforcement will force the Congress to amend it;
making exceptions would only permit unjust laws to linger on the
books. This approach has the added benefit of uniformity. The
elimination of discretion admits no space for discrimination; it is
truly blind to the accused's color, race, gender, or creed.'66
But indiscriminate prosecution is also inefficient. A criminal
code that accounted for every eventuality would be too
cumbersome to administer. Even now, the United States Code is
far too voluminous for any person to know all the laws that they
are obliged to obey, and it grows each year. "' Prosecutorial
discretion, by contrast, is.both more efficient and more just.'
164 Ashcroft, supra note 163.
65 See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 515, 534 (2000) ("One historic definition of the rule of law argues that
discretionary power has no place in legitimate government."); Jeffrey Reiman, Is
Police Discretion Justified in a Free Society?, in HANDLED WITH DISCRETION:
ETHICAL ISSUES IN POLICE DECISION MAKING 71, 81-82 (John Kleinig ed.,
1996) ("The laws should express the actual treatment that the society wants, and
police enforcement of those laws should be as automatic as possible. The
reduction of discretion should be carried throughout the system.").
166 Indeed, uniformity was a key concern raised in the Ashcroft memorandum,
which concludes, "Fundamental fairness requires that all defendants prosecuted
in the federal criminal justice system be subject to the same standards and
treated in a consistent manner." Ashcroft, supra note 163.
167 See Gene Healy, Introduction, in Go DIRECTLY To JAIL: THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING vii (Gene Healy ed., 2004)
(maintaining that, as a result of the increase in federal crimes, listed throughout
the U.S. Code and incorporating violations of federal regulations, "even teams
of legal researchers-let alone ordinary citizens-cannot reliably ascertain what
federal law prohibits").
168 See generally Arnie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical
Necessity: The Ashcroft Memorandum's Curtailment of the Prosecutor's Duty to
"Seek Justice, " 90 CORNELL L. REv. 237, 277-78 (2004) (arguing that the
Ashcroft memorandum inappropriately constrained prosecutorial discretion).
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Rather than requiring Congress to codify every exception to
criminal liability, Congress can criminalize a broad category of
usually blameworthy conduct-widespread copying of protected
works, for example-alongside a range of punishments. The
people then trust prosecutors to discern which infringement is truly
reprehensible, and trust judges to punish the condemned copiers
according to their culpability. Although this method admits the
human frailties of prejudice and discrimination, it also fosters the
virtue of mercy.169
The restoration of prosecutorial discretion in the United States
Attorneys' offices in 20100 thus came as a welcome change. The
Attorney General now regards prosecutorial discretion as
"essential to the fair, effective, and even-handed administration of
the federal criminal laws." "' Accordingly, each office of the
United States Attorney must maintain its own written guidelines
for the exercise of discretion.' 72
More recently, Attorney General Eric Holder announced an
even more aggressively lenient use of prosecutorial discretion."
At Holder's direction, the Justice Department issued new
guidelines dubbed Smart on Crime, which aim at reducing the
169 Appropriate prosecutorial discretion also guards against a situation in
which, as Harvey Silverglate vividly puts it, "the federal criminal justice system
has become a crude conviction machine instead of an engine of truth and
justice." HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: How THE FEDS
TARGET THE INNOCENT lxvi (Large Print ed. 2010).
1o Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr. to all federal prosecutors (May 19,
2010), available at http://edca.typepad.com/files/holder-memo-re-charging-and-
sentencing-decisions-1.pdf.
172 d.
173 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks
at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates,
JUSTICE.GOV (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/
ag-speech-130812.html (announcing a modification of the Justice Department's
charging policies to avoid mandatory minimum sentences for low-level,
nonviolent drug offenders and arguing that "federal prosecutors cannot-and
should not-bring every case or charge every defendant who stands accused of
violating federal law").
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sentences for nonviolent drug crimes.'74 Citing the enormous costs
to the government of a burgeoning population of aging, nonviolent
federal prisoners, the memo instructs federal prosecutors not to
charge the most serious, readily provable offense against
nonviolent drug offenders. "' Instead, prosecutors are to omit
specific drug quantities, so that judges will not be bound by
mandatory minimum sentences that the Attorney General considers
both draconian and expensive. 176 Like simple drug possession,
criminal copyright infringement is a nonviolent offense, and the
following guidelines aim to similarly limit the needless expense of
housing harmless prisoners.
B. Guidelines for Criminal Copyright Enforcement Against
Filesharing Services
In light of prosecutors' discretion to enforcement copyright
law, this Article proposes three guidelines to shape that discretion.
These suggestions are not intended as rules-that would be
anathema to the independent discretion the guidelines should
foster. But wholly untethered discretion leads to unpredictable
results; it prevents the Holmesian "bad man" from knowing the
price of his transgressions.
First, criminal enforcement of copyright should proceed only
on established theories of liability. The importance of this
guideline is underscored by the United States Attorneys' Manual
on prosecuting copyright cases, which cautions that "unsuccessful
prosecution may be counterproductive not only in terms of
allocation of resources, but also with respect to deterrence." "
Thus, prosecutors are instructed to "carefully evaluate[]" potential
legal problems with their case, "particularly with regard to criminal
intent.""' Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, prosecutors
174 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2-3 (2013), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/files/SMARTONCRIME.PDF.
175 d
"' Id176id
7 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-71.010 (2013), http://www.
justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia readingroom/usam/title9/71mcrm.htm#9-71.010.
178 Id.
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should be hesitant to charge offenses that have not already been
clearly defined by civil courts to avoid punishing people before
they might reasonably be expected to know that what they're doing
is a crime."'
As discussed, the theory of secondary liability is established
enough to proceed with prosecution against services like
Megaupload.'" Although some critics decry this theory as novel
as applied to criminal law,"' in reality its application is nearly as
old as criminal copyright law itself, dating back to 1909 when
Congress added the crime of "aiding and abetting" to the
Copyright Act to target the theater managers who helped connect
traveling infringers to their audiences. In the same way, especially
in the wake of Grokster, the groundwork has been well-laid for the
government to target filesharing services that help infringing
179 In his book Three Felonies a Day, Attorney Harvey Silverglate recalls
noticing that, as criminal statutes proliferated, "federal prosecutors grew more
inclined to bring criminal charges for deeds that, at most, constituted arguable
(sometimes barely arguable) civil offenses." SILVERGLATE, supra note 169, at
liii (emphasis omitted). The questions raised in these criminal cases, he argues,
should have been resolved in civil proceedings where "[t]he citizen, if wrong,
would have to pay a price measured in dollars; and once the clear meaning of
the statute or regulation was established, the citizen would be expected to adhere
to it, next time on penalty of criminal indictment and conviction." Id.
"s0 We caution, however, that, as exemplified by Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter,
689 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2012), the liability of "social-bookmarking" and, by
that same token, "linking" sites that do not actively encourage infringement is
still an evolving area of law. See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1169-77 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the adult-entertainment
company was unlikely to succeed in claim that Amazon and Google secondarily
infringed by displaying thumbnail images of the site's photos as reproduced on
infringing sites).
181 See, e.g., Ross Drath, Hotfile, Megaupload, and the Future of Copyright on
the Internet: What Can Cyberlockers Tell Us About DMCA Reform?, 12 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 218 (2012) ("The breathtaking
indictment alleges criminal secondary infringement, a theory that has not yet
been tested in court."); Jennifer Granick, Megaupload: A Lot Less Guilty Than
You Think, THE CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY BLOG (Jan. 26, 2012,
11:47 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/01/megaupload-lot-less-guilty-
you-think ("But the first question from a defense perspective has to be 'Can the
Grokster theory of CIVIL liability even be the basis for CRIMINAL copyright
claims?' This has never been decided by any Court.").
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uploaders reach the global Internet community. As shown by the
district court's decisive rejection of Megaupload's motion to
dismiss in the Perfect 10 case, 18 2 the time is ripe to hold services
like Megaupload accountable.
Second, the government should target prominent services.
Megaupload is a good example: when indicted, the company
claimed to be pulling in 4% of all Internet traffic and averaging 50
million daily visits."' This notoriety, or "big fish" factor, is important
because many users of filesharing services are low-cost infringers,
using search-engines to pirate 99-cent songs or $10 movies. There
are strong odds that shuttering high-traffic websites, those that
appear at the top of search queries, will significantly deter these
infringers. This theory is bolstered by evidence that, in the wake
of Megaupload's shutdown, digital revenues for movie studios
increased by 6 to 10%.184 The company's notoriety appears to have
also increased the prosecution's deterrent effect on other services,
as seen from a voluntary shutdown of a number of smaller
filesharing services following Megaupload's indictment.'
Third, criminal copyright enforcement should be limited to
circumstances where there is evidence that civil litigation will be
futile. The most obvious way that this futility arises is when
operators of a filesharing service refuse to respond to civil means
of copyright enforcement. This idea is echoed in the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual, which recommends that people "who have
182 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload, Ltd., No. 1 l-cv-0191, ECF Doc. No.
16, at 9 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss in regard to counts
of direct and contributory infringement). The case going forward ultimately
forced a settlement. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload, Ltd., No. 3:11 -cv-00191,
ECF Doc. 27 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011).
183 Indictment, supra note 80, at 2-3; see ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 222
(referring to Megaupload as "Public Internet Enemy No.1").
184 See Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Gone in 60 Seconds: The Impact
of the Megaupload Shutdown on Movie Sales 21 (March 6, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2229349.
1 See, e.g., Drath, supra note 181, at 220 ("In the wake of the Megaupload
indictment, many important cyberlockers have significantly altered or even shut
down their services.").
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continued to infringe for financial gain after civil remedies have
been successfully invoked should receive particular attention."'8 6
Accordingly, criminal prosecution should be saved for
filesharing services demonstrating an egregious disregard for
copyright law. Although some services' scofflaw attitudes may
spring from political disdain for copyright protections-The Pirate
Bay is affiliated with Sweden's Pirate Party' and Kim Dotcom
has publicly disagreed with protections for film releases '8-
opposition to copyright is not a crime. What shows prosecutable
contempt for the law are the steps the operators took to scorn
takedown complaints and profiteer from blatant infringement. The
Pirate Bay operators raked in advertising revenues while publicly
ridiculing infriigement complaints. Megaupload likewise made
millions by selling ads on infringing content'" while its employees
allegedly joked about aiding piracy and dodged takedown requests
by reposting links to infringing content. Similarly, after U.S.
officials seized TV Shack's original domain name, the site moved
within a day to a new domain, with a front page prominently
featuring the cover image of NWA's rap single "F*** the
Police."' Credible criminal sanctions, including a threat of prison,
186 MANUAL, supra note 177, at § 9-71.010.
187 See Miaoran Li, The Pirate Party and The Pirate Bay: How the Pirate Bay
Influences Sweden and International Copyright Relations, 21 PACE INT'L L.
REv. 281, 289 (2009).
188 See Adrianne Jeffries, Pirates Beware: Kim Dotcom's Mega isn't the Safe
Haven he Says it Is, THE VERGE (Jan. 31, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.theverge.
com/2013/1/31/3933774/kim-dotcoms-new-site-mega-is-a-flop-with-pirates-
and-heres-why ("Dotcom has said publicly that he does not support piracy for
music, but does support downloading movies, since the studios force people to
wait for staggered releases.").
189 According to the indictment, Megaupload made $25 million in advertising
revenues, and an additional $150 million from selling premium subscriptions.
Indictment, supra note 80, at 3. Dotcom received more than $42 million from
the conspiracy in 2010 alone. Id. at 14.
190 Christopher Williams, Student Richard O'Dwyer can be Extradited Over
TV Website, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2012, 4:50 PM), available at http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/9013 803/Student-Richard-ODwyer-can-be-
extradited-over-TV-website.html. The U.S. government seized the new site five
months later. Mark Brown, TVShack creator Richard O'Dwyer's US extradition
142 VOL. 15: 101
Criminal Filesharing Services
may be the only effective approach to this type of blatant disregard
for the law.
Although potentially necessary, imprisonment of copyright
infringers is not ideal. Prison creates a host of societal losses: the
expense of running jails, the lockup of wage earners, the potential
for civil-rights violations."' Moreover, when imprisonment is rarely
imposed, as in copyright cases, the deterrent effect is decreased.
As Judge Richard Posner has pointed out, "China executes
perpetrators of commercial crimes, but very few, and the crimes
appear to be rampant."' 92 On the other hand, as David Ladd,
former Register of Copyrights, has argued, perhaps "[o]nly
criminal penalties, with jail or the prospect of jail, are drastic
enough to restrain repeated offenders and to deter the flagrant
appeal delayed, WIRED.CO.UK (May 30, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/
archive/2012-05/30/tvshack-appeal-delayed.
191 Judge Posner addressed this topic in a recent concurrence from a Seventh
Circuit decision affirming a lengthy prison term:
Federal imprisonment is expensive to the government; the average
expense of maintaining a federal prisoner for a year is between $25,000
and $30,000, . . . and the expense rises steeply with the prisoner's age
because the medical component of a prisoner's expense will rise with
his age, especially if he is still alive in his 70s (not to mention his 80s
or 90s). It has been estimated that an elderly prisoner costs the prison
system between $60,000 and $70,000 a year....
That is not a net social cost, because if free these elderly prisoners
would in all likelihood receive Medicare and maybe Medicaid benefits
to cover their medical expenses. But if freed before they became
elderly, and employed, they would have contributed to the Medicare
and Medicaid programs through payroll taxes-which is a reminder of
an additional social cost of imprisonment: the loss of whatever income
the prisoner might lawfully have earned had he been free, income
reflecting his contribution to society through lawful employment.
United States v. Craig, 703 F.3d 1001, 1003 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (per curiam); see also Richard Posner, Does America Imprison Too
Many People? Posner, THE POSNER-BECKER BLOG (Dec. 4, 2011, 6:13 PM),
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2011/12/does-america-imprison-too-many-
people-posner.html ("[T]he indirect costs of high levels of incarceration must be
very great, in the form of the lost output of the large number of prisoners, most
of whom are of working age.").
192 Richard A. Posner, ANTITRUST LAW 271 (2d ed. 2001). Rather, Judge
Posner advocates steeper fines targeted toward deterring specific unwanted
activity. Id. at 271-73.
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kinds of piracy with which Congress has been concerned."'9 3 The
latter is especially relevant to curbing infringement by companies
that can absorb civil penalties as a mere cost of doing business, as
Megaupload did with Perfect 10.'4
The potential for imprisonment is not the only reason why
prosecutors might choose to pursue filesharing services through a
criminal rather than civil proceeding. In fact, there are at least five
procedural benefits to the government in criminal proceedings.
Each consequently presents hardships for filesharing services.
First, many of these services are headquartered overseas, making
civil litigation against them especially difficult."' Interestingly, this
problem harkens back to the early reasons for criminal copyright
sanctions: the difficulties of enforcing copyright laws against
transient performers.'9 6 Even though extradition for infringers can
be difficult to obtain 1' -indeed, the presiding judge in the
193 Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Copyright Laws: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong. 74 (1985).
194 Drath, supra note 181, at 217.
195 See Hatch, International Anti-Piracy Caucus Unveils "2010 International
Piracy Watch List," HATCH.SENATE.Gov (May 19, 2010), http://www.hatch.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=bl09414b-1b78-be3e-eOb8-
34869d0477c4.
196 Hardy, supra note 25, at 315. As the legislative history of the 1909
amendments to the Copyright Act reveals, the rationale behind the Act's
criminal sanctions were to protect against those infringers who "were both
financially irresponsible and transient in their business locations, making
injunctions and civil damages futile." John Lindenberg-Woods, The Smoking
Revolver: Criminal Copyright Infringement, BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
63, 66 (1979); see also Harv. L. Rev., supra note 26, at 1707.
197 The U.S. government's attempts to extradite the operators of Megaupload
have so far been unsuccessful. On top of that, Megaupload has twice moved to
dismiss the criminal case on the grounds that prosecutors have failed to mail it a
copy of the criminal summons as required by Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 4(c)(3)(C), as the company lacks a "last known address within the
district" or a "principal place of business elsewhere in the United States."
Lorraine Bailey, Feds Scramble to Keep Megaupload in Court, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (Jan. 16, 2013, 2:16 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/
01/16/53993.htm. The fact that the operators are overseas has caused other
problems as well. Megaupload's founder, Kim Dotcom, also challenged the raid
on his mansion in a New Zealand court and won: the court found that New
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Megaupload case has noted that the defendants "may never be
extradited"' 9 8-it is not even an option in civil litigation.'99 In civil
litigation, the best plaintiffs can hope for is that a defendant
consents to U.S. jurisdiction or, absent that, that the court might
agree to the rare use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) to
claim personal jurisdiction over defendants abroad. 200 Even then, if
Zealand authorities relied on overbroad-and thus invalid-search warrants and
improperly released copies of seized hard drives to the FBI. Dotcom v. Att'y
Gen. [2012] 3 NZLR 115 (HC) 130-36. The New Zealand prime minister also
apologized to Dotcom for the surveilling of his home, as surveillance of legal
residents is forbidden in New Zealand. Graeber, supra note 1, at 200. Living
abroad, Dotcom has even relaunched a new file-storage service in January 2013
called Mega. See David Kravets, File-Sharing Service Mega Is No Megaupload,
WIRED (Jan. 22, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2013/01/mega-is-no-megaupload/ ("All Mega appears to be is a storage service
that allows the encrypted storage and transfer of files to other members.").
198 United States v. Dotcom, No. 1: 12-cr-3, 2012 WL 4788433, at *2 n.6 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 5, 2012) (order denying motion to dismiss the indictment). The district
court refused to dismiss the case because, it reasoned, the government may be
able to comply with the rule by serving process on one of the operators of
Megaupload, once extradited, and that service may be construed as service on
the company if the court can pierce the corporate veil. Id. at *1 -*2.
'99 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2012) (criminal extradition statute). Generally under
this statute, the defendant must have been charged "with having committed
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by [an extradition] treaty or convention" and then must be brought
before a judge "to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and
considered." Id.
200 See Graduate Mgmt. Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589,
597-600 (E.D. Va. 2003). In Raju, a citizen of India was using a foreign
website to sell copyrighted study materials for the Graduate Management
Admission Test primarily to U.S. students. Id. at 590-91. The district court
held "that Raju's contacts with the United States are sufficient to permit the
exercise of personal jurisdiction" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2)
because he "directed his activities at the United States market" and yet "did not
sufficiently direct his activities at any given state to justify a finding of personal
jurisdiction in any state court." Id. at 600. The court added that:
To find otherwise would not only frustrate GMAC's attempts in this
case to vindicate its rights under United States law, by requiring
GMAC to turn to foreign courts to vindicate those rights against a
likely elusive defendant, it would also provide a blueprint whereby
other individuals bent on violating United States trademark and
copyright laws could do so without risking suit in a United States court.
Id.
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a defendant's assets never touch U.S. soil, any judgment entered
will likely never be enforced.20 '
Second, the federal government has the authority to quickly
shutter infringing sites. Federal courts generally treat domain
names as intangible property20 2 located wherever the domain-name
registry or registrar is.203 Because of this understanding, the U.S.
government has grounds for in rem jurisdiction over millions of
domain names, as the registry for all .com and .net domain names
is controlled by a Virginia company.20 4 This jurisdictional hook
allows the government to shut down even foreign sites by seizing
them through civil forfeiture,20 as it did with "Operation in Our
201 Raju resulted in a default judgment. Id. at 600.
202 See, e.g., CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir.
2010) ("Like the majority of states to have addressed the issue, California law
recognizes a property interest in domain names.") The Laxton court also quotes
that " 'courts generally hold that domain names are subject to the same laws as
other types of intangible property.' "Id. (quoting JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET
LAW 120 (6th ed. 2008)).
203 The Ninth Circuit in Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini, 596 F.3d 696, 702 (9th
Cir. 2010), for example, decided that, under California law, domain names were
located where the registry was located for the purpose of asserting quasi in rem
jurisdiction.
204 See Belleville, supra note 8, at 315 ("Any web sites with a '.com' or '.net'
top level domain name are hosted at a registry operated by Verisign, Inc. in
Virginia."); David Kravets, Uncle Sam: If It Ends in .Com, It's Seizable, WIRED
(Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/feds-seize-foreign-
sites/ ("A complicated web of bureaucracy and Commerce Department-dictated
contracts signed in 1999 established that key domains would be contracted out
to Network Solutions, which was acquired by VeriSign in 2000. That cemented
control of all-important .com and .net domains with a U.S. company-
VeriSign-putting every website using one of those addresses firmly within
reach of American courts regardless of where the owners are located-possibly
forever.").
205 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981, 2323 (2012); see also United States v. Davis, 628
F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, when civil forfeiture is used in
actions not brought under a civil forfeiture statute, as when "Immigration and
Customs Enforcement officers acting pursuant to their authority under 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1595 and 1595a," the government must establish probable cause that the
property is being used for unlawful activity); see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)
(explaining that, otherwise, the burden of proof is preponderance of the
evidence).
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Sites."206
Third, in a criminal proceeding, the government is able to
freeze or seize all sorts of assets it believes are instruments or
proceeds of criminal activity.207 Megaupload's assets subject to
forfeiture included a slew of domain names, computer servers,
bank accounts, vehicles, and expensive electronics. 208 Although a
New Zealand court eventually returned some of these assets as
improperly seized under New Zealand law,209 assets in Hong Kong
and the United States were also frozen or seized, including servers
in Virginia. 210 An unfortunate side effect of these actions is that
206 See Jack Mellyn, "Reach Out and Touch Someone": The Growing Use of
Domain Name Seizure as a Vehicle for the Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S.
Law, 42 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1241, 1254 (2011) (explaining how, during Operation
in Our Sites, "seizure warrants were obtained from a federal judge and were
served on Verisign, the Virginia-based administrator responsible for maintaining
the authoritative list of .com and .net domain names"). This procedure was not
necessary with Megaupload, however, as the company used a Washington-based
domain-name registrar and located 525 of its computer servers in Virginia,
where the indictment was filed. Indictment, supra note 80, at 19; see also
Kravets, supra note 204 ("[T]he issue of the U.S.'s legal dominion claim over
all .com domains wasn't an issue in the January seizure of the domain of
megaupload.com, which is implicated in one of the largest criminal copyright
cases in U.S. history. Megaupload.com was registered in the United States with
a registrar based in Washington state."); Nate Anderson, Explainer: How Can
the US Seize a "Hong Kong site" like Megaupload?, ARS TECHNICA, (Jan. 20,
2012, 5:05 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/01/explainer-how-can-
the-us-seize-a-hong-kong-site-like-megaupload/.
207 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2323; Lee, supra note 75, at 65-
67 (discussing the government's seizure of Megaupload assets). The
government must comply with the Fourth Amendment, of course, but courts are
still working out the extent of these protections in the digital age. A fuller
analysis of the Fourth Amendment's application to seizures of computer data is
outside the scope of this Article. The Authors recommend Professor Orin Kerr's
comprehensive article on the topic as a good starting point. See Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REv. 531, 547-65
(2005).
208 Indictment, supra note 80, at 83-89. The vehicles included two Mercedes-
Benz ML63 AMGs with vanity plates reading "MAFIA" and "GUILTY." Id. at
87.
209 See supra note 197.
210 Timothy Lee, Feds: We Can Freeze Megaupload Assets Even if Case
Dismissed, WIRED (July 27, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
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some of Megaupload's users lost access to lawfully stored data.2 '
Fourth, the government has a unique ability to collect evidence
by search warrant, rather than subpoena. The Fourth Amendment
limitations of computer searches are, like the rules for data seizure,
still being defined, as computers fit poorly into canons developed
around searches of people's homes.2 2 But in the Megaupload case,
the government's search powers led to the collection of scores of
incriminating internal communications from the Mega-
conspirators. 213 Technology journalists speculate that the FBI
planted spyware 214 to collect data from the Mega-conspirators'
2012/07/megaupload-freeze/; see also Chester Yung, Hong Kong Freezes
Megaupload Assets, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2012, 5:50 AM), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SBl00014240529702043014 04577174362457114578.html.
211 See Rebuttal Memorandum in Support of Renewal of Specially Appearing
Defendant Megaupload Limited's Request for Dismissal of the Superseding
Indictment Without Prejudice at 1, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1: 12-cr-00003-
LO, ECF Doc. No. 162 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 2013). The Electronic Frontier
Foundation filed briefs on behalf of Megaupload users affected by the seizure of
the servers holding their data, arguing that the property should be returned under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) as obtained in "callous disregard" of
their property rights. Id. at 1-2. Under Rule 41(g), any "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may
move for the property's return." Negotiations are still ongoing regarding the
fate of this data, which is currently being stored, at great expense, by Carpathia
Hosting, the company that leased the servers to Megaupload. See Timothy B.
Lee, ISP: Storing 25 Petabytes of Megaupload Data Costs Us $9,000 a Day,
ARs TECHNICA (Mar. 22, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/03/isp-storing-25-petabytes-of-megaupload-data-costs-us-9000-a-
day/.
212 Kerr, supra note 207, at 536-40; see also United States v. Flores-Lopez,
670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012) (addressing the application of the Fourth
Amendment to a cell phone and noting that "a modem cell phone is a
computer").
213 See Greg Sandoval & Declan McCullagh, Feds: We Obtained
MegaUpload Conversations with Search Warrant, CNET (Jan. 31, 2012, 4:19
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001 3-57368523-261/feds-we-obtained-
megaupload-conversations-with-search-warrant/.
214 Merriam-Webster's online dictionary defines "spyware" as "software that
is installed in a computer without the user's knowledge and transmits
information about the user's computer activities over the Internet." Spyware
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.con
dictionary/spyware (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
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local hard drives, because the government has produced five-year-
old instant messages the conspirators sent via Skype, an online
video-chatting service, which only stores messages for thirty
days.215 Suffice it to say, these records are unlikely to have been
discovered through civil litigation.216
Fifth, there are potential benefits to pursuing criminal
restitution rather than civil damages. To be sure, in a typical
criminal copyright case, criminal restitution may limit an injured
party's recovery. The Mandatory Victim Recovery Act2 17 authorizes
compensation only for victims' actual losses; recovery of an
infringer's profits is saved for civil means.218 Moreover, actual
losses can be especially hard to prove in copyright-infringement
cases because the number of people who download free or
reduced-price infringing products may not accurately reflect the
size of those products' legitimate customer base.219 Nonetheless,
215 Sandoval & McCullagh, supra note 213. Only emails, not Skype chats, are
listed in the indictment of Megaupload; the Skype chats were disclosed by the
FBI during proceedings in New Zealand related to its investigation of the
company. Id
216 For another tale of the government using its powers to gather evidence
against an alleged secondary copyright infringer, Brian McCarthy of
Channelsurfing.net, see Nate Anderson, Illegal TV Streamers, Here's How the
Feds Will Hunt You Down, ARTS TECHNICA (Mar. 3, 2011, 7:52 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20 11/03/illegal-tv-streamers-heres-how-the-
feds-will-hunt-you-down/.
217 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (2012).
218 See, e.g., United States v. Fair, 699 F.3d 508, 513-16 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
The D.C. Circuit, in Fair, referred to decisions from the Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in declaring that "[t]he circuit
courts of appeals are in general agreement that the defendant's gain is not an
appropriate measure of the victim's actual loss in MVRA calculations." Id. The
D.C. Circuit then reversed a restitution award against an infringer who had sold
illicit copies of Adobe software because the government had only proven the
defendant's profits, not Adobe's actual loss. Id at 514-16. The court noted that
crime victims "may" achieve disgorgement of profits and ill-gotten gains
through other statutory and civil-recovery mechanisms." Id. at 514.
219 Id. at 515 (noting that there was no evidence that an infringer's customers
would have purchased full-price products from the copyright holder); see also
United States v. Hudson, 483 F.3d 707, 710 (10th Cir. 2007) (expressing
skepticism that customers agreement to purchase reduced-price software proves
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there is at least one potential benefit of restitution: restitution
allows one court to divvy up relief to all injured parties in a
proceeding spearheaded by the government, whereas litigation may
proceed piecemeal led by the few rights-holders with the means to
advance their cause.220 Thus, restitution may be preferable when
the potential victims are numerous, as is the case with file-sharing
services.
Given the benefits of criminal prosecution, it is perhaps curious
that the government has not gone after other delinquent file-
sharing services. Florida-based Grooveshark, for example, has
been sued by major music labels EMI and Universal for more than
$15 billion in damages,22 ' and five other sites-including China's
Baidu and Germany's RapidShare-were listed along with The
Pirate Bay by Congress's International Anti-Piracy Caucus as
"overwhelmingly used for the global exchange of illegal movies,
music and other copyrighted works."22 2 There are jurisdictional
problems, however, with targeting foreign sites and inherent
inefficiencies in prosecuting Grooveshark when civil litigation
against it is ongoing. Mostly, though, the existence of these other
sites again illustrates the importance of prosecutorial discretion:
prosecutorial powers should be used only after authorities collect
the type of evidence of profiteering and defiance of civil copyright
laws exhibited by services like Megaupload and The Pirate Bay.
that they "would have agreed to purchase the same number of copies from [the
copyright holder] Microsoft").
220 A federal court must order restitution to any victim of copyright
infringement under 18 U.S.C. § 2323(c) and in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3556, 3663A, and 3664. See5 NIMMER&NIMMER,supra note 35, at § 15.07
[C][2].
221 See Steve Musil, Grooveshark Now Feels Lawsuit Wrath of All Major
Music Labels, CNET, (Jan. 5, 2012, 8:51 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
1023_3-57353515-93/grooveshark-now-feels-lawsuit-wrath-of-all-major-music-
labels/; Graeme McMillan, Universal Music Sues Music Streaming Service for
100,000 Illegal Uploads, TIME (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.digitalmusicnews.
com/permalink/201 1/111 123grooveshark.
222 Hatch, International Anti-Piracy Caucus Unveils "2010 International
Piracy Watch List," supra note 195.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article thus concludes with a note of caution. Given the history
of increasingly severe criminal penalties for copyright infringement
under U.S. law, there is every reason to expect that federal prosecutors
will continue to wield a "big stick" against file-sharing services. As this
Article has emphasized, there are advantages and efficiencies to criminal
prosecutions over civil lawsuits: the federal government wields power to
seize sites, to extradite, to freeze assets, and to record internal
conversations surreptitiously as means to deter those file-sharing services
refusing to comply with civil-enforcement efforts. And because
prosecutorial discretion is more efficient than ill-advised attempts at
blanket enforcement, this Article provides guidelines for the exercise of
that discretion. Specifically, prosecutors should look for situations where
liability under civil law is clearly established and civil enforcement is
likely to be futile, and they should aim to prosecute the most prominent
infringing services fitting those criteria.
But a prosecutor's circumspection accomplishes more than just
efficiency. Megaupload has not been convicted, and may never be,
yet its business has been shut down, its assets frozen, its customers
left unable to retrieve even lawfully stored data. Some of this smacks
of the treatment of the King's Messenger: punishment first, with trial
after.223 As argued, when the alleged conduct is egregious, and civil
lawsuits are ineffective, then a criminal prosecution, with all its
attendant hardships for the accused, may be warranted. But the
guidelines here are intended as limitations, not as a call to pursue
more prosecutions. Because the powers of federal prosecutors are
great, a reluctance to use those powers is a virtue that preserves
liberty.
223 In Through the Looking-Glass, the White Queen tells Alice (the titular
heroine of Alice 's Adventures in Wonderland) about the temporal predicament
of the King's Messenger, who is "in prison now, being punished: and the trial
doesn't even begin till next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of
all." See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE
FOUND THERE 77-78 (Florence Milner ed., Rand McNally & Co. 1917). Alice
is horrified. Id. "Suppose he never commits the crime?" she asks. Id But the
White Queen points out that he would be the better for it; after all, when
someone commits a crime and is punished, they are the better for it-so it must
be better still if they can be punished without having committed the crime at all.
Id.
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